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ROUNDING UP THE USUAL SUSPECTS:
A LEGAL AND LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF DNA
TRAWLING CASES*
DAVID H. KAYE**
Courts are beginning to confront a problem that has divided the
scientific community-whether identifying a defendant by fishing
through a database of DNA types to find a match to a crime-scene
sample reduces the significance of a match. For years, the problem
seemed academic. Now that the United States has more than six
million DNA profiles from convicted offenders and suspects in a
national, computer-searchable database, the question is more
urgent. Increasingly, individuals are being charged with crimes as a
result of a match between their recorded profile and the DNA from
a victim or scene of a crime. Some of these defendants have moved
to exclude the DNA evidence, arguing that there is no generally
accepted scientific opinion on how the probative value of a match
from a database trawl should be quantified. Trial courts have ruled
both ways. Appellate courts in California and the District of
Columbia have rebuffed these challenges, reasoning that the
general-acceptance standard for scientific evidence does not apply
in this situation. Furthermore, they have held that the jury can be
given the usual probability that a randomly selected individual will
match a crime-scene sample. Elaborating on earlier, Bayesian
statistical analyses of the database-trawl question, this Article
defends the admissibility of the random-match probability even
when the defendant was not selected randomly. It also considers
various alternatives to the introduction of this probability and
proposes modifications to the "np rule" for adjusting a random-
match probability p by the database size n.
* Copyright © 2009 by David H. Kaye.
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Life Sciences, and Fellow, Center for the Study of Law, Science and Technology, Arizona
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INTRODUCTION
Countries around the world have established databases
consisting of the DNA profiles of suspected or convicted offenders.'
1. England is the world's leader, having started the first national criminal DNA
database in 1995. In proportion to the population, the British database is "the largest of
any country: 5.2% of the UK population is on the database compared with 0.5% in the
USA.... By the end of 2005 over 3.4 million DNA profiles were held on the database-
the profiles of the majority of the known active offender population." U.K. Home Office,
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In the United States, state and federal databases in the FBI's National
DNA Index System hold over six million DNA profiles of people who
have been convicted, arrested, or detained for various crimes.2 These
identification databases have helped solve cases that have baffled
investigators for decades. In one instance, a fifty-eight-year-old man
became a suspect in over twenty-four rapes in three states dating back
to 1973 as a result of a coordinated database search.' More recently,
a DNA database match to a highly degraded semen sample
culminated in the conviction of "John Puckett, an obese, wheelchair-
bound 70-year-old" for murdering Diana Sylvester, a "22-year-old
San Francisco nurse [who] had been sexually assaulted and stabbed in
the heart" in her San Francisco apartment over thirty years ago.4 In
addition to such dramatic but relatively rare "cold cases," database
trawls have considerable potential to solve common property crimes
such as automobile theft and petty burglaries.'
When the DNA profile from a crime-scene stain matches a DNA
pattern on file, the person identified by this "cold hit" becomes a
target of the investigation. A fresh sample will be taken from the
suspect to verify the DNA match, and other evidence normally will
reinforce the investigatory lead. In some cases, prosecutors will even
proceed with almost no evidence beyond the cold hit. In one such
case, a San Francisco jury convicted John Davis, already behind bars
for robbery and other crimes, of the murder of his neighbor, Barbara
Martz, nearly twenty-two years earlier.6 The database match was all
the jurors had to go on.' The prosecution maintained that this match
The National DNA Database, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/science-research/using-
science/dna-database/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2008).
2. FBI, CODIS-NDIS Statistics, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/clickmap.htm (last
visited Dec. 22, 2008).
3. Julia Preston, After 32 Years, Clothing Yields DNA Key to Dozens of Rapes, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at Al. He was promptly convicted of the thirty-two-year-old rape.
Julia Preston, After 3 Decades, Guilty Verdict in Rape Case, With Help From DNA, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at B1. Of course, database matches are not limited to high profile
crimes. See, e.g., Shaila K. Dewan, As Police Extend Use of DNA, A Smudge Could Trap
a Thief, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at Al; Alison Gendar, DNA Test Buoys Rob Busts,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 29, 2005, http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/2005/03/
29/2005-03-29 dnatest buoysrobbusts.html.
4. Jason Felch & Maura Dolan, When a Match is Far from a Lock, L.A. TIMES, May
4, 2008, at Al; People v. Puckett, No. 201396 (Super. Ct., S. F. County 2008).
5. Dewan, supra note 3; Gendar, supra note 3; Charlie Jannetto, DNA Solves Wider
Range of Crimes, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 27, 2008, at B1, available at
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2008/07/27/2008072 7 7dnaO7 2 7 .html.
6. Jaxon Van Derbeken, DNA Nails Neighbor in 1985 Murder, S.F. CHRON., Aug.
28, 2007, at Bi.
7. Id.
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was enough for a conviction because the "random-match
probability"-the probability that a randomly selected, unrelated
individual would match the crime-scene DNA sample-was in the
quadrillionths.8  After discussing the remote possibility of an
unknown, identical twin to the defendant, the jury convicted.9 In the
Puckett trial, a much larger (and hence less impressive) random-
match probability of one in 1.1 million proved persuasive."
Cases like Davis and Puckett that emanate from cold hits have
been called "trawl"'" cases because "the DNA match itself made the
defendant a suspect, and the match was discovered only by searching
through a database of previously obtained DNA samples."' 2 These
database-trawl cases can be contrasted with traditional "confirmation
cases" in which "other evidence has made the defendant a suspect
and so warranted testing his DNA."13 In terms of this dichotomy, the
statistical and evidentiary issue is whether the fact that the defendant
was selected for prosecution by trawling requires an adjustment to the
normally tiny random-match probability to reflect the greater
probability of a match to at least one suspect in the database. Two
committees of the National Academy of Sciences ("NAS")
recommended adjusting for the search strategy. In their influential
reports on "DNA Forensic Science" released by the National
Research Council ("NRC") 4 in 1992"s and 1996,16 the committees
reasoned that a match resulting from a trawl is less impressive than a
match in a confirmation case. 7 Their reasoning is based on a
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Felch & Dolan, supra note 4.
11. David J. Balding, Errors and Misunderstandings in the Second NRC Report, 37
JURIMETRICS J. 469, 470 (1997).
12. Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches and the Legal
Consumption of Scientific Evidence, 97 MICH. L. REV. 931, 932 (1999).
13. Id.
14. "The National Research Council (NRC) functions under the auspices of the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the National Academy of Engineering (NAE), and
the Institute of Medicine (IOM)." Welcome to the National Research Council,
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/nrc/index.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2008). The NRC
seeks "to improve government decision making and public policy, increase public
education and understanding, and promote the acquisition and dissemination of
knowledge in matters involving science, engineering, technology, and health." Id.
Although the organizational structure of the National Academies is not crucial here, I
refer to the two DNA committees as NAS committees and their reports as NRC reports.
15. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SC.,
DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992) [hereinafter NRC I].
16. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI.: AN UPDATE, THE
EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996) [hereinafter NRC II].
17. See infra Part II.A.
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"frequentist" theory of statistical hypothesis testing, which holds that
an investigator can reject a particular hypothesis (the "null
hypothesis") in favor of an alternative hypothesis when the
probability of observing the data (assuming that the null hypothesis is
true) is sufficiently small.18 For example, we might toss a coin twenty
times to test the null hypothesis that the coin is fair. A large
imbalance between heads and tails would count as evidence against
this null hypothesis. The probability of so large an imbalance is
known as a "p-value." Small p-values indicate that the evidence is
inconsistent with the null hypothesis-we would not see so large a
discrepancy between the numbers of heads and tail very often if the
coin were fair.
The null hypothesis emphasized by the committees is that the
source of the DNA from the crime scene is someone who is not in the
database (and hence that the individual caught in the trawl is
innocent). The committees concluded that the random-match
probability is not the appropriate p-value for testing this null
hypothesis. After all, in repeated trawls of innocent databases-those
that do not include the source of the crime-scene DNA-a match to
someone in the database would be a more common event than the
random-match probability suggests. As the 1996 committees pointed
out, observing twenty heads in a row when flipping a fair coin is
astonishing-the p-value is about one in a million-but the same
observation-twenty heads in a row-is less impressive if one has
flipped the coin millions of times. 9 To account for this "multiple
testing,"2 the NRC reports described approaches that would inflate
the normal random-match probability, making a match in a database-
trawl case appear to be less probative than in a confirmation case.21
18. See, e.g., DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 11 (2004) (surveying theories of statistical reasoning
and their application to legal proof). More generally, the probability used to evaluate the
null hypothesis pertains to all possible data as extreme or more extreme (relative to what
would be expected under the null hypothesis) than what was observed. Id. § 11.8.2.
19. NRC II, supra note 16, at 134.
20. NRC I, supra note 15, at 124.
21. Id.
20091
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The response has been disputation and litigation.22  The
adjustments for trawling have been criticized as addressing the wrong
hypothesis and as needlessly conservative, but "[t]he mathematical
arguments given by [each] side appear impressive" and "there is [so]
much confused writing [on the subject that] it would be very difficult
for a court to make a reasoned decision based on a simple assessment
of [the] literature recommendations."23  Only three published
opinions consider whether the prosecution can use the random-match
probability for a confirmation case in a trawl case. In United States v.
Jenkins,24 People v. Johnson,25 and People v. Nelson,26 defendants
argued, to no avail, that the scientific community does not agree on a
single statistic to characterize the import of a database trawl, and until
it does, even the fact of a match should not be admitted.
This legal argument invokes a specialized rule for scientific
evidence that requires a showing of "general acceptance" within the
scientific community. Having originated in the 1923 case of Frye v.
United States,27 this requirement is deeply entrenched in the law of
many states.28 It is one form of especially strict scrutiny for scientific,
as opposed to other types of, expert evidence.29 Another version of
strict scrutiny is found in the celebrated opinion of the Supreme
Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3" and later
codified in an amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Daubert
instructs judges to ensure that the scientific evidence is truly
"reliable" by examining general acceptance along with a variety of
22. The NRC reports (and the assessment of their recommendations by the FBI's
DNA Advisory Board, Statistical and Population Genetics Issues Affecting the Evaluation
of the Frequency of Occurrence of DNA Profiles Calculated From Pertinent Population
Database(s), FORENSIC SCI. COMMS., July 2000, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/
july2000/dnastat.htm, reprinted in JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY,
TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF STR MARKERS 613 (2d ed. 2005)), are not the last
words on the subject in the statistical literature. See Simon Walsh & John Buckleton,
DNA Intelligence Databases, in FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE INTERPRETATION 439, 464-
65 (John S. Buckleton et al. eds., 2005); Geir Storvik & Thore Egeland, The DNA
Database Search Controversy Revisited: Bridging the Bayesian-Frequentist Gap, 63
BIOMETRICS 922, 922-23 (2007) (reviewing the literature).
23. Walsh & Buckleton, supra note 22, at 464-65.
24. 887 A.2d 1013 (D.C. 2005).
25. 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587 (Ct. App. 2006).
26. 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399 (C. App. 2006), affd, 185 P.3d 49 (Cal. 2008).
27. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (rejecting primitive lie-detector evidence as not
generally accepted).
28. See, e.g., KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 5.3.
29. Id. § 5.1.
30. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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other indicia of scientific validity.31 Yet, the appellate courts in
Washington, D.C., and California rejected the argument that the
"unadjusted random-match probability" has to be evaluated under
the general-acceptance standard of Frye, and their reasoning applies
with equal force to the scientific-validity standard of Daubert. With
Frye (and Daubert) out of the way, these courts quickly upheld the
admission of the unadjusted random-match probability in the trawl
cases.
This Article argues that Jenkins, Johnson, and Nelson reached
the correct result. The dispute over adjustment does not involve the
general acceptance (Frye) or scientific validity (Daubert) of the
formulas for estimating a random-match probability or the p-value
for the null hypothesis that the database is innocent. The real issue is
which statistic or statistics are logically relevant (and not unfairly
prejudicial) in a trawl case. The analysis of relevance and prejudice
that I shall present demonstrates that the random-match probability
for a DNA profile need not be adjusted to account for a database
trawl. Such an analysis is needed because the opinions do not directly
address the frequentist argument that the unadjusted random-match
probability is unfair and misleading. As a result, they do not
demonstrate that admitting the random-match probability rather than
an adjusted probability is the correct answer to the relevance
inquiry.32
This Article fills this gap. Part I examines the three appellate
opinions in detail. This Part enunciates the rationales that the courts
in Jenkins, Johnson, and Nelson relied on and finds them wanting.
Part II presents a better theory for using unadjusted random-
match probabilities than the explanations given in Jenkins, Johnson,
and Nelson. This Part attempts to accommodate the conflicting
intuitions that have led to the scientific divide. It recognizes that the
31. Id. at 593-95. For elaboration and analysis of the two standards as well as a
discussion of a third "relevancy-helpfulness" approach used in still other jurisdictions, see
KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 5.3.
32. As two statisticians recently observed:
The discussion about [the] approaches [to quantifying the evidence in a trawl case]
now has somewhat died out (at least in scientific journals), with most scientists in
the field preferring the [no-adjustment] approach. Still, a satisfactory explanation
for the differences between these approaches and full understanding with respect
to some of the aspects in the criticisms that have appeared is lacking.
Storvik & Egeland, supra note 22, at 922. With respect to the developing case law, this
assessment is apt. The opinions do not reflect a "full understanding" and do not provide
an entirely "satisfactory explanation" for using the random-match probability.
2009]
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apparent "statistical significance" of a result can evaporate if the
finding is the product of a "search for significance." Nevertheless, it
uses an elementary formula of probability theory, Bayes' rule, to
explain why this concern does not apply to the kind of database
searches undertaken in criminal investigations.33
Part III of the Article considers how defendants in trawl cases
might respond to the apparently overwhelming random-match
probabilities and what courts can do to avoid unfair prejudice. In a
reprise to a legal debate that has stretched across four decades,34 it
describes an unusual case in which jurors equipped with court-issued
pocket calculators were encouraged to apply Bayes' rule for
themselves. Part III does not defend this particular procedure, but it
does maintain that, contrary to recent opinions in England and the
United States, the defendant should have the opportunity to use the
mathematical logic to minimize the impact of the DNA match in this
kind of case. It also shows that if defendants are allowed to introduce
the adjusted random-match probability advocated in the 1996 NRC
report, the adjustment should be modified in a manner that was
overlooked in the report.
I. TRAWLING IN DATABASES: THE CASES
Prosecutors have been regaling jurors with unadjusted random-
match probabilities in trawl cases for at least fifteen years. In 1994,
Troy Bloom was convicted of rape after emerging as one of five
suspects generated by a search of Minnesota's convicted-offender
database. After extending the DNA testing to more loci, the state
produced testimony that Bloom matched semen in the victim's car at
all the loci and "that the probability of a random match was 1 in 4.6
million."35 In Bloom and other trawl cases, however, defendants did
not challenge the propriety of the random-match probability as a
33. Cf. Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1021-22
(1977) (introducing Bayes' rule as an analytical tool or "heuristic" device to explore the
concept of relevance).
34. The seminal articles are Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian
Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970), and Laurence H.
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1329 (1971). See generally KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 12.4.3 (describing posterior
probabilities and courts' approaches to them).
35. Bloom v. State, No. C8-97-885 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1998), available at
http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=mn&vol=appunpub\9802\885&invol
=1 (unpublished opinion denying post-conviction relief). For earlier proceedings, see
State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1994); David Chanen, Court of Appeals Upholds
'94 Rape Conviction that Used DNA Analysis, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Feb. 1,
1996, at B3.
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measure of the significance of a match. The first concerted challenge
to the use of unadjusted probabilities came some ten years later,
around 2005. In United States v. Jenkins,36 a trial court in Washington,
D.C., excluded the random-match probability, but the jurisdiction's
highest court overturned this ruling. As defendants continued to
press their objection, appellate courts in California issued opinions
with different theories as to why the random-match probability is
admissible. In People v. Nelson,37 California's Supreme Court, citing
Jenkins, unanimously endorsed one of these theories. This Part
describes these developments and suggests that the judicial analyses
in this wave of cases are too shallow to dispose of the objection to
unadjusted probabilities. We begin with Jenkins.
A. A Murder on Capitol Hill
Dennis Dolinger was a community activist known for
establishing a neighborhood patrol to thwart drug dealers. 8 He lived
on Capitol Hill in the southeastern section of the District.39 On June
4, 1999, police found his body in the basement of his Potomac Avenue
home. a° He had been stabbed repeatedly in the head.41 His wallet, a
diamond ring and a gold chain were missing.42 Blood was on clothing
in the basement and in a room on the second floor.4 3 More blood
drops led from the basement, throughout the house, and out to the
yard and sidewalk. 4 The case seemed to be solved when Stephen
Watson, a resident of nearby Alexandria, Virginia, was discovered
with Dolinger's credit card and other personal items.45 Watson
remained in jail for several months awaiting trial,46 but the case
against him fell apart after the D.C. police sent samples of the trail of
blood to the FBI. "[Thirty] or so" of these samples did not match
Dolinger's DNA.47  Furthermore, they had the same one-person
profile, indicating that they all came from a single assailant who must
36. 887 A.2d 1013 (D.C. 2005).
37. 185 P.3d 49 (Cal. 2008).
38. Eric M. Weiss, Va. Man Convicted In Activist's Killing, WASH. POST, June 28,
2006, at B9.
39. Id.






46. Weiss, supra note 38.
47. Transcript of Record at 3, Jenkins, 887 A.2d 1013 (No. F320-002005).
2009]
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have been injured in the course of the stabbings.48 But this man was
not Stephen Watson-Watson's DNA profile was different.49
So the government dismissed the murder charge against
Watson." It also asked the state of Virginia to run the profile of the
unknown samples through the state's database of profiles from
101,905 convicted offenders.51 At that time, the database was limited
to eight "STR loci" 52-locations in the genome where the lengths of a
class of sequences vary from one person to another. 53  The state's
computer whizzed through the digits representing the length
variations, or "alleles." Out popped the name "Robert P. Garrett," a
known alias of Raymond Anthony Jenkins.54
Jenkins was easy to find. Normally, he lived across the Potomac
River, in Arlington, Virginia, but having been arrested on an
unrelated burglary charge a few weeks after Dolinger's death, he was
in prison.55 The authorities secured a search warrant for his blood.56
To no one's surprise, it matched the blood from Dolinger's house.
Indeed, the fresh sample provided a full thirteen-locus match.57 The
government's estimates of the frequencies of the profile in the general
population were astonishingly small-between one in twenty-six
quintillion (1/26,000,000,000,000,000,000) and one in four sextillion
(1/4,000,000,000,000,000,000,000). 58 In January 2000, Jenkins was
charged with the murder.59
48. Jenkins, 887 A.2d at 1017.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1017 n.3.
51. Id. at 1017.
52. Id. at 1017 n.4.
53. Although an eight-locus match typically is quite revealing, see, e.g., NAT'L
COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA
TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP
(2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/183697.pdf, the standard number of
loci used in databases in the United States currently is thirteen. See, e.g., FBI, CODIS:
COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM (brochure), available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/
html/codisbrochuretext.htm. Very roughly, each additional locus increases the
discriminating power of a match by a factor of ten. See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE
OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra.
54. Jenkins, 887 A.2d at 1017.
55. Henri E. Cauvin, Jury Deadlocks in Case that Relied on DNA, WASH. POST, Apr.
15, 2005, at B10.
56. Jenkins, 887 A.2d at 1017.
57. Id.
58. Jenkins, 887 A.2d at 1019. Stated more succinctly, the estimated random-match
probability in various racial or ethnic groups was on the order of 10- "' to 10-"1.
59. Weiss, supra note 38.
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1. A Battle over the DNA Match
Jenkins filed a motion in limine to exclude the DNA evidence.'
Of the various attacks on its admissibility, one struck home. Jenkins
argued that presenting the numbers quoted above to express the
significance of a DNA match in a trawl case is not generally accepted
in the scientific community and therefore is inadmissible under Frye
v. United States. There is, he contended, a "raging debate" in the
scientific and statistical community regarding the most appropriate
method for calculating the significance of a cold hit.61 He had a point.
In the words of one statistician, "[r]arely can there have been such an
important application of statistics in which ... differing intuitions and
approaches ... lead to answers so vividly and violently opposed."62
The government argued that the debate was beside the point.
The disagreement, it maintained, concerned the relevance of various
probabilities or statistics rather than the validity of the formulas for
computing them.63 And relevance, it insisted, was a matter for the
court, not the scientific community, to decide.' 4
The trial judge held a pretrial hearing on the objection. Besieged
with, "among other things, scholarly articles from reputable
professional journals[,] ... expert affidavits from leaders in the fields
of genetics and statistics[, and] live testimony of" a human geneticist
and two population geneticists,65 Judge Rhonda Reid Winston
struggled valiantly to describe and categorize the cacophony of expert
voices.66 She found that no method or combination of methods for
presenting probabilities in a trawl case was generally accepted. It was
"the last thing the Court wants, but I think that that's where I am
60. Jenkins, 887 A.2d at 1017.
61. Id.
62. Philip Dawid, Bayes's Theorem and Weighing Evidence by Juries, in BAYES'S
THEOREM 71, 87 (Richard Swinburne ed. 2002).
63. Transcript of Record, supra note 47, at 5.
64. Id.
65. United States v. Jenkins, 887 A.2d 1013,1017-18 (D.C. 2005).
66. The prosecution and defense traded affidavits solicited from members of the 1996
committee giving their interpretations of the NRC report's recommendations. See id. at
1017 (noting that "[b]oth parties submitted ... expert affidavits from leaders in the fields
of genetics and statistics"). I submitted an affidavit for the defendant stating that I did not
consider it appropriate to attempt to divine, years later, what the various committee
members thought the words of the report meant. I pointed out, however, that as
evidenced by the responses in the legal and statistical literature, the readers of the report
at the time generally understood it as calling for the presentation of an adjusted
probability when the defendant was identified through a database search. More recently,
yet another member of the committee told newspaper reporters that "[t]he intent was to
replace Random Match Probability." Felch & Dolan, supra note 4.
2009]
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forced to end up. '6 7 Rejecting the government's position that Frye
did not apply and assuming that some probability had to be
presented, she threw out all the DNA evidence.'
In an interlocutory appeal, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals overruled the order.69 It adopted the government's view that
Frye need not be applied.70 The case went to trial with the random-
match probability.7' But even this evidence was not enough. After
five days of deliberations, the jury remained deadlocked, and the
superior court declared a mistrial.7 The government elected to retry
Jenkins. This time, the jury convicted Jenkins of all charges,
including felony first-degree murder. "We're just so elated," said
Michele Gehrke, a cousin of Dolinger's.73
2. The Easy Way Out: The Pem and np Rules
In trawl cases like Jenkins, the admissibility issues are twofold.
First, is a particular quantity in the case of a database search a
generally accepted statistic or a scientifically valid one? Four
quantitative measures of significance for a match coming out of a
database trawl might be proposed: the frequency (or "rarity") of a
DNA profile in the relevant population, the random-match
probability (which equals the expected frequency), the "likelihood
ratio" (which is given by the reciprocal of the random-match
probability when it is certain that the laboratory will declare a match
between samples with the same profile), 74 and the "posterior
probability" that the defendant is the source of the crime-scene
sample. If the method for computing any of these quantities is not
generally accepted, then the corresponding statistic must be excluded
in Frye jurisdictions.76 If the method is not scientifically valid, then
the statistic it produces must be excluded in Daubert jurisdictions.77
Even if the Frye or Daubert hurdle is cleared, however, courts must
also determine whether the statistic is irrelevant or unduly
67. Transcript of Record, supra note 47, at 25.
68. Jenkins, 887 A.2d at 1020.
69. Id. at 1026.
70. Id. ("We hold only that the trial court erred in subjecting a debate on relevancy to
the exacting Frye standard of general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.").
71. Cauvin, supra note 55.
72. Id.
73. Weiss, supra note 38.
74. The technical concept of "likelihood" is explained infra Parts II & III.
75. "Posterior" and "prior" probabilities are explained infra Parts II & III.
76. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 5.3.3.
77. Id.
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misleading. If so, the quantity (and perhaps the underlying match)
must be excluded under the familiar rules that require all evidence to
be relevant and not unfairly prejudicial.7"
Initially, the government's effort to introduce the DNA match in
Jenkins foundered when the trial court perceived no way to avoid the
conflicting scientific literature on the need to adjust the random-
match probability in trawl cases.79 Among other things, both NRC
reports recommend adjusting the random-match probability when the
defendant is selected for prosecution as a result of the trawl. The
1992 NAS committee explained that
[t]he distinction between finding a match between an evidence
sample and a suspect sample and finding a match between an
evidence sample and one of many entries in a DNA profile
databank is important. The chance of finding a match in the
second case is considerably higher, because one does not start
with a single hypothesis to test (i.e., that the evidence was left
by a particular suspect), but instead fishes through the
databank, trying out many hypotheses.8"
The committee observed that "there are statistical methods for
correcting for such multiple testing," but proposed "a far better
solution" to this problem: "When a match is obtained between an
evidence sample and a databank entry, the match should be
confirmed by testing with additional loci.... [O]nly the statistical
frequency associated with the additional loci should be presented at
trial (to prevent the selection bias that is inherent in searching a
databank)."81
This procedure may be designated the "limit the loci" approach
because it reserves loci for further testing after an initial set of hits in
the database and ignores the match at the initial set of loci in
computing the match probability. The adjusted probability, p...
which is based solely on the remaining loci, will be larger-probably
orders of magnitude larger-than the random-match probability p for
all the loci. This larger probability implies that the match is less
probative. To appreciate this, suppose that a single match turns up
when one searches the database at a predetermined set of eight loci
78. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 401, 403. In general, this Article does not address the
issue of the prejudicial impact of a generally accepted or scientifically valid figure. For
cases and commentary on this point, see, for example, State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159
(Minn. 1994), and KAYE ET AL., supra note 28, § 12.
79. Jenkins, 887 A.2d at 1020.
80. NRC I, supra note 15, at 124.
81. Id.
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and that the suspect so identified matches at the remaining five loci
used to confirm the preliminary match. If the random-match
probability for all thirteen loci is one in ten trillion (10 -"3) and the
random-match probability for the five confirmatory loci is one in one
hundred thousand (10-'), the jury would receive only the figure of one
in one hundred thousand for the probability of a matching profile in
the general population.
Dismissing the bulk of the match (the eight loci used in the trawl)
is generally a very conservative way to "correct" for the "multiple
testing" that worried the 1992 committee. From the frequentist
perspective, however, it is appropriate because it indicates how often
database trawls could lead to false inclusions. If the two-stage
procedure recommended in the 1992 NRC report were followed in a
vast number of cases involving DNA profiles that give rise to a five-
locus random-match probability of one in one hundred thousand, and
if no database ever contains DNA from the true source of the crime-
scene DNA, then the rate at which suspects would be falsely
identified from their DNA would not exceed one in one hundred
thousand.2
The 1996 NAS committee started from the same premise that
giving an upper bound on the rate of false identifications is important.
"There is," the committee maintained, "an important difference
[when] the suspect is initially identified by searching a database to
find a DNA profile matching that left at a crime scene."83  The
committee then wrote that "the' calculation of a match probability...
should take into account the search process" and that "there are
different ways to take the search process into account."'  Its
preferred "correction to account for the database search" was to
"multiply the match probability [p] by the size [n] of the database
searched." 5 With a trawl through a national database as large as the
ones in the United Kingdom or the United States, this multiply-by-
the-size-of-the-database approach would mean multiplying by a
factor of about six million. A random-match probability of one in ten
82. One in one hundred thousand is an expected value that applies in the limit as the
number of trawls approaches infinity. For a finite numbers of trawls, the error rate could
be somewhat larger or smaller, just as the proportion of heads in a large but finite set of
tosses of a fair coin need not be exactly one-half. See, e.g., MORRIS H. DEGROOT &
MARK J. SCHERVISH, PROBABILITY AND STATISITICs, 233-35 (3d ed. 2002) (proving the
law of large numbers that underlies the claim that the mean value of a variable in a large
random sample from an infinite population is likely to be close to the population mean).
83. NRC II, supra note 16, at 134.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 134-35.
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trillion (1/10,000,000,000) would increase to about six in ten thousand
(6/10,000). The latter number is an indication of how often searching
"innocent databases" (those that never contain the true source) of
size n = 6,000,000 for DNA profiles with random-match probabilities
of p = 1/10,000,000,000 will generate cold hits that could result in
charges against an innocent person.
Several astute statisticians promptly challenged the committees'
recommendation to adjust the usual random-match probability p.
Their views are described more fully in Part II.B. Given the very
vocal disagreement of respected scientists and statisticians, the trial
judge in Jenkins accurately perceived a serious controversy.
Nonetheless, there was an easy way out of the controversy.
Judge Winston could have allowed the government to present an
adjusted number that the scientific community properly regards as
either fair or very generous to the defendant. Both the limit-the-loci
approach and the np rule fill this bill. Unintentionally, the database
search in Jenkins proceeded with a limited number of loci, as
contemplated by the 1992 NAS committee. The initial database
match was limited to eight loci, and another five were added only
after the verification sample of Jenkins' blood was obtained with a
search warrant.86 Rather than present the full thirteen-locus random-
match probability, the government could have provided the random-
match probability for the five-locus STR type that played no role in
the database trawl. This value of prem would have been far larger than
the government's estimate of quadrillionths and sextillionths for the
thirteen-locus random-match probability. Indeed, the probability as
adjusted to the limited set of five loci could have been as large as
1/1634.87 With match probabilities of this magnitude, a defendant is in
a much better position to maintain that DNA evidence leaves room
for reasonable doubt.
The trial judge was unwilling to countenance the introduction of
p .... however, because limiting the match probability to these loci (1)
"wasn't ever implemented [before]," (2) "wastes evidence," and
because (3) "everybody is testing the maximum number of loci that
86. This assumes that the thirteen-locus match of the second sample from Jenkins
included all of the eight loci from the original match.
87. The figure of 1/1634 is the largest random-match probability for the most common
alleles at any five loci in any of the three groups (Caucasians, African Americans, and
Hispanics) studied in John M. Butler et al., Allele Frequencies for 15 Autosomal STR Loci
on U.S. Caucasian, African American, and Hispanic Populations, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 908,
909-11 (2003).
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are available [s]o it would be difficult to implement."88  However,
none of these explanations constitute a reason not to have allowed
the five-locus probability. It is true that laboratories have not rushed
to limit the number of loci used in trawling, but the software for
trawling allows searches at a reduced number of loci. The software
has to have this capacity because crime-scene samples can be too
degraded or minute to be typeable at all thirteen core CODIS loci.89
In addition, sample size permitting, it is possible to examine loci
beyond the thirteen standard ones after an initial database match at
all thirteen.9" Therefore, contrary to the third point raised by the trial
judge, the limit-the-loci approach would not be difficult to implement
in general. Moreover, having unintentionally conducted the initial
search in the Virginia database in the manner prescribed by the NAS
committee, the adjusted number certainly was available in Jenkins.
Neither are points (1) or (2) persuasive. Despite the lack of
implementation and the waste of information, there is no doubt that
the limit-the-loci approach is a conservative response to the
frequentist objection to random-match probability in a trawl case. As
Judge Winston noted, "it's conservative and nobody disagreed with
the method that was used to calculate it."9  Because there is no
dispute that the limit-the-loci approach is a scientifically valid way to
arrive at a probability that favors the defendant, a defendant cannot
validly contend that Frye or Daubert bars the introduction of p...
Thus, Judge Winston could have disposed of the Frye objection by
admitting the match along with only the adjusted figure p.. 92
88. Transcript of Record, supra note 47, at 25.
89. The "core loci" are those that the FBI designated for use in the National DNA
Index System (NDIS). See, e.g., FBI's DNA Advisory Board, supra note 22, at 94.
90. The real reason not to require second-stage additional tests is that they would be a
waste of laboratory time and effort. The identifying information in a thirteen-locus match
is more than sufficient even in a trawl case. See infra Part II.
91. Transcript of Record, supra note 47, at 24-25; cf. N. E. Morton, The Forensic
DNA Endgame, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 477, 489 (1997) ("To the delight of scientists and
judges and the disappointment of mathematicians, this solution puts an end to controversy
about interpretation of suspect trawls in a very large database.").
92. That said, it may be unfair to fault the trial court for not finding general
acceptance when both parties urged this view of the limit-the-loci approach on the court.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Ambrosino advised the court that:
[O]ur position, Your Honor, is that I don't believe there is general acceptance.
You can[not] find general acceptance of a principle that's never been ...
implemented by any forensic lab.... [N]o, I don't think the Court could hold there
is general acceptance of something that's never been done even since it's [sic]
recommendation in '92.
Transcript of Record, supra note 47, at 24.
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Alternatively, the court could have admitted the np figure. As
with the limit-the-loci approach, the complaint about the np rule in
the forensic statistical literature is that it is unnecessarily
conservative. 93 This may make the np statistic unappetizing to the
prosecution, which would prefer the smaller random-match
probability, but it is not a reason to exclude it under Frye or Daubert.
Once again, a defendant cannot coherently argue that a probability
estimate that scientists agree is either correct or too large (and hence
understates the power of the DNA evidence) cannot be introduced
against him.
' In Jenkins, application of the np rule actually would have made
no meaningful difference in the match probability. The unadjusted
probability was, at most, about p = 10-19, and the database size was
about n = 10'. The np rule therefore gives a match probability of
approximately 1014, or one in a hundred trillion. Nonetheless, the
government was reluctant to give this figure to the jury even as a
supplement to the unadjusted value of p. The ostensible reason was
solicitude for the rights of the defendant. At oral argument, "[t]he
government indicated that... it would [not] present both.., statistics
... without a trial court request [because of] the potential prejudicial
effect of informing the jury that Mr. Jenkins' DNA profile was
already on file in a Virginia offender database."94
The court of appeals was unimpressed with this explanation. It
responded that
[t]his prejudice, however, is no different than that which would
have occurred had the trial court allowed introduction of
statistics derived from the 1992 National Research Council
recommendation to test confirmatory loci. In explaining why
"untainted" loci were tested, the proffered expert would be
required to state that Mr. Jenkins was first identified through a
search of an offender database. Because countless trial courts,
including the trial court in the instant case, have so readily
accepted the statistics derived from testing untainted loci, we
must surmise that conveying to the jury that the defendant was
Still, it is unfortunate that the court did not recognize that the position of all
counsel in the case was untenable. The reluctance of the DNA-testing community to
implement the procedure does not reflect any disagreement over the proposition that it
produces a generous quantitative measure of the probative value of a match in a trawl
case. The main reason that the limit-the-loci approach has not been implemented is that
prosecutors prefer the smallest probabilities they can get and laboratories have no
incentive to adopt a procedure that they see as understating the value of their findings.
93. See, e.g., Balding, supra note 11, at 470-73.
94. United States v. Jenkins, 887 A.2d 1013, 1019 n.13 (D.C. 2005).
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first identified through a search of an offender database has not
been deemed so substantially prejudicial as to outweigh the
probative value of such evidence."
This categorical rejection of the character evidence concern is
unconvincing because it assumes that adjusting the random-match
probability necessarily entails revealing that the defendant has a prior
record. In fact, the expert can testify that the probability of a match if
the crime-scene DNA came from a person genetically unrelated to
the defendant is the adjusted number (prem or np) or less. There is no
need to explain on direct examination that the "or less" qualification
stems from the trawl, and it is not clear that revelation of trawling has
occurred in "countless" cases.
At the same time, a categorical rule against revealing that a
defendant's DNA was in a law enforcement database also seems too
strong. The general rule against introducing evidence of a
defendant's other crimes does not apply when the purpose of the
revelation is something other than the suggestion of a general
propensity to criminality.96 Accordingly, this rule should not prevent
the prosecution (and certainly not the defense) from revealing that
the defendant was found through a DNA database trawl, at least
where the bona fide purpose of the information is to help the jury to
understand the DNA match. Instead of a categorical rule of
admission or exclusion, a case-by-case balancing of the value of the
information for this legitimate purpose as against its potential
prejudice to the defendant is appropriate.97
In short, the objection to the np figure in Jenkins could have
been disposed of without prejudicing the defendant by presenting
only that number (as an upper bound on the probability of a random
match with anyone unrelated to the defendant). Why was the
prosecution unwilling to present np in lieu of its more cherished
values of quintillions and sextillionths? Surely, no prosecutor could
have been distressed at the prospect of going into court with a "one in
hundred trillion" match statistic.
One possibility is that the government was concerned about
other cases involving highly degraded or limited DNA samples. With
only a few alleles, np would be less overwhelming. In People v.
Puckett, for instance, the random-match probability for the match at
95. Id. at 1025 n.20.
96. See, e.g., 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (Kenneth Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006).
97. Id.
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six loci98 was said to be about one in 1.1 million.9 9 The California
database had 338,000 profiles in it, making np almost one in three-a
number that would render the match almost worthless to the
prosecution.00 If Jenkins was a test case for the supremacy of the
unadjusted probability p, then the government succeeded brilliantly.
The court of appeal opinion in Jenkins states that p and np are each
somehow relevant in a trawl case and that neither is prejudicial.01
3. I've Got Your Numbers
Section A.2 showed that in Jenkins and in most trawl cases,
neither Frye nor Daubert is a real barrier to admitting one or the
other adjusted-match probabilities. Both adjustments favor the
defendant and one is not inherently superior to the other. If the
prosecution's experts are content to use only the np or pre,, statistics, a
court need not try to judge the statistical debate over which figure
logically applies. At worst, these numbers err on the side of the
defendant. Because this evidentiary compromise was not acceptable
to the parties in Jenkins, however, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals had to address the statistical controversy over adjustment of
the random-match probability. This Subsection first explains how the
court of appeals correctly concluded that the controversy over which
statistic to use should not be analyzed in terms of the general-
acceptance (or scientific-validity) standards. Having properly sited
the issue in the general doctrine of relevance, however, the Jenkins
court skirted the statistical debate, reasoning that all three statistics
(p, np, and Prem) are admissible because each one is relevant to some
proposition.10 2 This Subsection argues that this attempt to sidestep
the statistical debate is a move in the wrong direction; to resolve the
98. Felch & Dolan, supra note 4, refer to "5 " matching "genetic markers" that were.
"mixed with traces of DNA from another person, probably [the victim]." Id. The match
probability introduced at trial came from six loci. Human beings have one or two STR
types at each locus, depending on whether they inherited the same allele from each parent
(homozygosity) or a different allele from each parent (heterozygosity). The laboratory
reported clear STR types at four loci (one being homozygous). A fifth locus showed three
alleles, indicating a mixture consistent with Puckett and the victim. A sixth locus showed
two alleles, but one gave too weak a signal to be characterized. S.F. POLICE DEP'T,
FORENSIC SCIENCE DIVISION, CRIMINALISTICS LABORATORY, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT
OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION, CASE NO. 040 027 547 & 721 032 24(0), Aug. 24, 2007,
at 3 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
99. S.F. POLICE DEP'T, supra note 98, at 4; Felch & Dolan, supra note 4.
100. These figures are taken from Felch & Dolan, supra note 4.
101. United States v. Jenkins, 887 A.2d 1013, 1024-25 (D.C. 2005).
102. Id.
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relevance question, courts must confront the disagreement among
statisticians.
To begin with, the court of appeal in Jenkins correctly identified
the logical nature of the statistical dispute:
At the heart of this debate is a disagreement over the
competing questions to be asked, not the methodologies used to
answer those questions.... T]here is no controversy in the
relevant scientific community as to the accuracy of the various
formulas. In other words, the math that underlies the
calculations is not being questioned. Each approach to
expressing significance of a cold hit DNA match accurately
answers the question it seeks to address. The rarity statistic [p]
accurately expresses how rare a genetic profile is in a given
society. Database match probability [np] accurately expresses
the probability of obtaining a cold hit from a search of a
particular database. [Another computation] accurately
expresses the [posterior] probability that the person identified
through the cold hit is the actual source of the DNA in light of
the fact that a known quantity of potential suspects was
eliminated through the database search. These competing
schools of thought do not question or challenge the validity of
the computations and mathematics relied upon by the others.
Instead, the arguments raised by each of the proponents simply
state that their formulation is more probative, not more correct.
Thus, the debate cited by Mr. Jenkins is one of relevancy, not
methodology; and ... there is no basis under Porter for the trial
court to exclude the DNA evidence in this case.1°3
Concluding that "Frye, therefore, does not impede introduction
of the statistics into evidence," 1" the Jenkins court moved on to the
real question in the case-which number or numbers are relevant
after a trawl? Despite this promising start, the court's answer to the
relevance question is disappointing. The court insisted that
the most probative evidence for a factfinder is that which
indicates whether or not the DNA obtained from a crime scene
matches the DNA obtained from the suspect. The likelihood
that the suspect is the actual source of the DNA is best
expressed through the rarity of a particular profile. Thus, the
103. Id. at 1022-23 (citations omitted). "Porter" refers to United States v. Porter, 618
A.2d 629 (D.C. 1992). In that case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a
particular procedure for computing a random-match probability in a confirmation case did
not satisfy Frye and directed the trial court to consider whether an alternative method was
generally accepted as conservative. Id. at 631.
104. Jenkins, 887 A.2d. at 1026.
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rarity statistic is highly probative and will always be relevant.
In fact, in this appellate record there is nothing that would
suggest that the probative value of ... the rarity statistic ... is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact."5
The "rarity statistic" is simply a relative frequency. In Jenkins, it
was one in so many quintillions or sextillions. In Puckett, it was one
in 1.1 million. But why is "the rarity of a particular profile" the best
measure of the probability "that the suspect is the actual source of the
DNA"? Indeed, why is it even relevant to this proposition? The
frequentist position is that the frequency, or rarity, is relevant in a
confirmation case because the frequency is also the random-match
probability, which can be understood as the probability of a matching
profile when the defendant is not the source (and is not closely
related to the actual source). In other words, the frequency is a p-
value, and small p-values justify rejection of the null hypothesis that
the suspect is not the actual source." 6 Once this null hypothesis is
rejected, the jury is a step closer to the conclusion that the defendant
is in fact the actual source.
But, defense counsel can argue this logic applies only to the
confirmation case. In that kind of a case, the frequency, or random-
match probability, is indeed the probability of the match to an
innocent, unrelated person. With the frequency estimate of one in 1.1
million in Puckett, it would be quite surprising if Puckett were the
only person tested and he matched. But Puckett was not the only
person tested. Over three hundred thousand DNA profiles were
examined. If everyone in the database were innocent, it still would be
no great surprise to learn that one or more of them matched. The p-
value for the trawl (as computed with the np rule) is about one in
three. Hence, the frequentist perspective seems to suggest that the
"rarity statistic" is not the best measure of probative value. On the
contrary, it is thoroughly misleading.
This seems like a powerful argument against the relevance of the
"rarity statistic" and its equivalent, the random-match probability, but
the Jenkins court basically ignores it. Rather than join or assess the
debate between the frequentists and their critics, the court
conveniently assumes that, in a trawl case, the jury would benefit
from the answers to three distinct questions: (1) "[H]ow rare [is] a
genetic profile ... in a given society" (the random-match
probability)? (2) How probable is "a cold hit from a search of a
105. Id. at 1025 (citations omitted).
106. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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particular database" (the np statistic)? And (3) How probable is it
"that the person identified through the cold hit is the actual source of
the DNA in light of the fact that [the defendant's DNA profile
matched while] a known quantity of potential suspects was eliminated
through the database search" (the posterior probability)?1 17
But why are these questions relevant, and why is any one of them
more apposite than another? Judicial fiat cannot supply the answer.
Neither can the disciplines of population genetics, human genetics, or
molecular biology. The issue is one of probability, statistics, and
inductive logic. We need to analyze the probative value of a DNA
match-the extent to which it supports the prosecution's claim that
the defendant is the source of the crime-scene DNA° 8-with and
without a trawl. That is the subject of both the articles and the debate
that the Jenkins court deemed irrelevant. Without addressing the
debate, the Jenkins court has no basis to conclude that the frequency
or random-match probability p is preferable to or even admissible
along with the database-match probability np. We shall analyze this
debate, and defend the result in Jenkins, in Part II.
B. California Dreaming: Johnson and Nelson
The next challenges to random-match probabilities in database
trawl cases that reached the appellate courts occurred in California.
The California courts have followed Jenkins, but they also have
devised a new theory as to why an unadjusted random-match
probability can be admitted in a trawl case. This rationale can be
called a "replication theory" since it holds that the problem with the
trawl vanishes once the match is replicated with a fresh sample from
the suspect whose name came from the trawl. This Section shows that
the replication theory is patently fallacious.
The replication theory first took root in People v. Johnson. On a
winter's night in 1996, a fifteen-year-old girl was at a pay telephone in
Visalia, California, speaking to her boyfriend.0 9 A man speaking a
mixture of Spanish and English drew a knife, forced her into a pickup
truck, and drove to a rural area.' He raped her, and then drove her
back into town.' At a hospital, semen was collected from her body,
107. Jenkins, 887 A.2d at 1023.
108. On probative value generally, see 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 96, § 185, at 306-10.
For a quantitative analysis, see D.H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Misquantification
of Probative Value, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 645,646-47 (2003).
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and she described the assailant and the truck in impressive detail.112
After some initial efforts, the police gave up on the case.113
Five years later, the unanalyzed rape kit from the hospital
examination went to the California Department of Justice Regional
Laboratory.1 4  A criminalist detected sperm cells on one of the
vaginal smear slides." 5 She sent the materials to a central laboratory,
which obtained a thirteen-locus STR profile." 6 A trawl of the
national database implicated a prisoner named Michael Johnson." 7 It
was now 2003."8 Investigators took a blood sample from Johnson.1 9
The DNA matched that in the sperm.12 A criminalist estimated that
the matching STR genotype would "occur at random in the general
population in about one in 130 quadrillion African-Americans, one in
240 quadrillion Caucasians, and one in 4.3 quadrillion Hispanics.
1 21
After hearing this testimony, a jury convicted Johnson of rape
and related offenses. 22 He appealed. One of his arguments was that,
at the time, STR typing and the random-match probability for an
STR genotype were not generally accepted in the scientific
community.123  The trial court rejected this claim after a pretrial
evidentiary hearing. 24  Although Johnson raised no particular
objection in these proceedings to using a random-match probability in
a trawl case, on appeal he pressed the point that "because the instant
case involved a cold hit, the foundation concerning the statistical
112. Id. at 590-91.
113. The day after the assault, the police showed her a pickup truck that they had
impounded. She was positive that it was the one in which she lay crouched on the floor
boards as a tattooed, Hispanic male with black hair and a "Fu manchu mustache" drove
her back and forth. Id. at 591. However, the truck's owner was Robert Calkins, a white
man "with long hair and a fullbrown [sic] beard." Id. at 591 n.3. What the police
apparently did not realize (or failed to appreciate) was that Calkins had just bought the
truck, and it seems that they did not investigate who else might have been driving it. Id. at
591. The police showed the girl 576 photographs of possible suspects. She was unable to
identify anyone. By late 1996, they gave up on the case. Id.








122. Id. at 589.
123. Id. at 590.
124. Id. at 592-93.
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interpretation of the DNA evidence was insufficient to satisfy the
[general acceptance] standard for scientific evidence."'25
The California Court of Appeal rejected the claim, but it stated
that "the presentation of various statistical analyses" of the three
questions listed in Jenkins "would raise significant relevancy and
[prejudice] issues." '126 The court chose not to follow Jenkins'
reasoning that the question of which statistic to apply (p, p.., or np) is
simply a matter of logical relevance for the court to determine.
Instead, the court sought to avoid the thorny statistical question on
the curious ground that "the database search merely provides law
enforcement with an investigative tool, not evidence of guilt.' 12 7
General acceptance does not apply to the method of computing a
match probability for a database search, because "the use of database
searches as a means of identifying potential suspects is not new or
novel" and "no authority [applies the] requirements to a mere
investigative technique."'2 8
It is true that the initial match in the database will be replicated
by drawing and analyzing a new sample from the individual involved.
This is what happened in Jenkins and Johnson. Such replication is a
red herring, however, because the challenge is not to the use of a
convicted-offender DNA database as an investigatory tool. The
objection is to the use of the random-match probability at trial to
gauge the power of the later match when the defendant has not been
selected for DNA testing "at random"-that is to say, on the basis of
factors that are uncorrelated with his DNA profile. When the
defendant is selected for a later test precisely because of his known
DNA profile, the replication adds no new information about the
hypothesis that the defendant is unrelated to the actual perpetrator
and just happens to have the matching DNA profile.'29 Replication
125. Id. at 594. Ordinarily, an appellate court would not entertain an objection to
evidence that had not been raised at trial. The court of appeal thought that "the
[procedural] question here is a close one" and elected to "assume the issue is cognizable
and decide it on the merits to forestall appellant's alternative claim that trial counsel was
ineffective if he failed adequately to preserve the issue." Id. at 594 n.11.
126. Id. at 601.
127. Id. at 597.
128. Id. at 596-97. The court expressed "no opinion concerning a situation in which
the fact of the preliminary, 'cold hit' match from the offender database is offered as
evidence of guilt." Id. at 598 n.17.
129. It adds no such information because the datum-a matching profile in the new
sample-is just as probable when this hypothesis is true as when it is false. If the
defendant is innocent and just happens to have the incriminating profile (and if the
laboratory reports are accurate) then he will have that profile in one sample after another.
Likewise, if the defendant is guilty and has the incriminating profile because he is indeed
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helps eliminate the risk of a laboratory error in determining or
reporting the STRs, but it has no further value in probing the
possibility of a coincidental match.
Yet the Johnson opinion proclaims that the original match,
rather than the replicated match, is logically irrelevant:
In our view, the means by which a particular person comes to
be suspected of a crime-the reason law enforcement's
investigation focuses on him-is irrelevant to the issue to be
decided at trial, i.e., that person's guilt or innocence, except
insofar as it provides independent evidence of guilt or
innocence. For example, assume police are investigating a
robbery. The victim identifies "Joey" as the perpetrator. The
means by which "Joey" becomes the focus of the
investigation-the eyewitness identification-is relevant
because that identification is itself evidence of guilt. Suppose
instead that a surveillance camera captures the robbery on tape.
Police use facial recognition software to check the robber's
facial features against driver's license photographs. When the
computer indicates a match with "Joey," officers obtain his
name and address from DMV records, then go to his house and
interview him. In the course of the interview, "Joey" confesses.
Whether facial recognition software is discerning and accurate
enough to select the perpetrator, or whether it declared a match
involving many different people who resembled "Joey," or how
many driver's license photographs were searched by the
software, is immaterial: what matters is the subsequent
confirmatory investigation.130
The Johnson court's analogy is flawed because it assumes that
Joey is no more likely to confess if he is found by the face-recognition
software than by some other means. But suppose that whenever a
suspect is identified by the computer program, the police pressure
him into confessing (because they believe in the technology) and that
they apply no such pressure in other situations (where they are less
certain of guilt). Then the confession is redundant, and how Joey
came to the attention of the police makes quite a difference in the
probative value of the confession.
A more apt analogy would be a case in which Joey is identified
by the pattern-recognition algorithm applied to the drivers' licenses,
and the police then take a fresh photograph of Joey and process it
the source of the crime-scene DNA, he will have the same profile in one sample after
another.
130. Johnson, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 597 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
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with the same scanner and algorithm. Naturally, there are two
matches. But what of it? If a trawl through the DMV records
degrades probative value, the confirmation with the new photograph
does not restore what was lost. It is as if the police got their suspect
from the trawl, then ran the program a second time with just the
defendant's DMV photo. Contrary to the suggestion in Johnson,"'
the second, redundant effort cannot make the fact of the initial trawl
"irrelevant to the issue to be decided at trial." '132 In short, the
replication theory does not avoid the trawl objection. The objection
is that the search strategy degrades the probative value of both the
initial match in the database and the subsequent replication match,
requiring an adjustment to the random-match probability to provide a
scientifically valid and fair measure of either item of evidence.
Despite this fact, the replication theory adopted in Johnson
spread to another of California's judicial districts. In People v.
Nelson, the victim, a college student, had been abducted at a parking
lot in 1976, brutally "raped and drowned in mud." '133 Dennis Louis
Nelson was a suspect, but the police never developed an adequate
case against him."3 Twenty-five years later, semen derived from
material in storage yielded an STR profile.135 A trawl through the
state's database netted Nelson.136 The laboratory reported that "this
profile would occur at random among unrelated individuals in about
one in nine hundred and fifty sextillion African Americans, one in
one hundred and thirty septillion Caucasians, and one in nine
hundred and thirty sextillion Hispanics." '137
131. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
132. Johnson, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 597. The replication in these pattern-recognition
cases-photographs or DNA-is completely unlike the kind of replication that scientists
demand before they are inclined to accept as real the finding of an association between a
locus found to be associated with a common disease by trawling across many loci. David J.
Hunter & Peter Kraft, Drinking from the Fire Hose-Statistical Issues in Genomewide
Association Studies, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 436, 436 (2007). In that case, if the original
finding were mere happenstance, it would be surprising to find a strong association with
the same locus in an independent sample. In contrast, it is no surprise that the laboratory
can find the same profile when it examines a second or even a third sample from the same
individual. That kind of replication should occur whether or not the original finding was
happenstance. With a likelihood ratio of one (with respect to the hypothesis of a
coincidental match among unrelated individuals), it is the later evidence that is arguably
irrelevant.




137. People v. Nelson 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, 404 n.2 (Ct. App. 2005).
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In 2002, Nelson was charged with the 1976 rape and murder.
After a pretrial effort to suppress the DNA evidence failed, he
maintained at trial that he "had consensual intercourse [with the
victim] on the weekend before she disappeared and that someone else
abducted, raped, and murdered her."13 The defense was "without
evidentiary support,"'39 and the jury convicted Nelson of murder.
Like Johnson and Jenkins before him, Nelson argued on appeal
that "the DNA evidence should not have been introduced because...
there is no generally accepted statistical method for explaining the
significance of DNA evidence when a suspect is identified through
use of a convicted offender databank."'4 ° Weaving together the
flawed strands of reasoning in Johnson and Jenkins, the California
Court of Appeal rejected the argument. The Nelson court wrote that
[u]se of the product rule to compute a random-match
probability is overwhelmingly accepted by the scientific
community as a scientifically reliable means of demonstrating
the rarity of a profile in the population.... Consequently, the
technique satisfies the reliability prong of the [general-
acceptance] test and it was for the trial court, not the scientific
community, to determine the relevance of the technique to this
criminal prosecution.14'
Unfortunately, like the D.C. Court of Appeals in Jenkins, the
California Court of Appeal in Nelson provided no explanation of why
''rarity" is relevant or probative not merely in a confirmation case,
but also in a trawl case.
The other strand of the Nelson court's analysis came from
Johnson. The court insisted that
[t]he DNA databank search merely identified defendant as a
possible candidate as the murderer; it was not the basis for
declaring that his DNA matched DNA on the evidentiary
samples. The latter determination was made based upon
further, complete testing utilizing scientific techniques found to
be reliable and admissible under the [general-acceptance]
test.
14
The "further, complete testing," however, only consisted of
verifying the hit in the database with DNA taken from the defendant
138. Id. at 404.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 411.
141. Id. at 418.
142. Id. at 402.
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with a warrant procured as a direct result of that cold hit. As
discussed in connection with Johnson,14 the argument that later
searches replicate the match from the trawl is not responsive to the
concern that an initial trawl dilutes the probative value of the
matching DNA. The frequentist argument, it will be recalled, is that
any number of DNA matches based on a trawl is weaker evidence
than one DNA match to a suspect identified independently of his
DNA type. The replication here is too transparent a garment to
cloak the fact of a trawl.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court unanimously affirmed
the Court of Appeal. The supreme court's opinion studiously (and
perhaps pointedly) avoids the replication theory. Quoting from
Jenkins, the California Supreme Court correctly reasoned that Frye
does not apply to the question of which statistic is logically relevant.1"
Then the court relied on the fact that there was no dispute over the
random-match probability as an estimate of "the rarity statistic." '145
However, the analysis remains incomplete, for the opinion does not
discuss why "the rarity statistic" is relevant.146 This population
frequency or random-match probability is not relevant for its own
sake, even in a simple confirmation case. It is relevant only insofar as
143. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
144. People v. Nelson, 185 P.3d 49, 61 (Cal. 2008) ("[I]t is already established that the
product rule reliably shows what it purports to show-the rarity of the genetic profile in
the population group. Accordingly, its admissibility in a cold hit case is a question of
relevance, not scientific acceptance, and it is thus not subject to a further Kelly
[California's version of Frye] test.").
145. Id. at 64.
146. Nelson goes one step beyond Jenkins in this regard but then stumbles. Justice
Chin's opinion for the California Supreme Court states that:
The database match probability ascertains the probability of a match from a given
database [that does not contain a profile from the source of the crime-scene
sample]. 'But the database is not on trial. Only the defendant is.' ([D.H. Kaye &
George Sensabaugh, DNA Typing, in 4] Modem Scientific Evidence[: The Law
and Science of Expert Testimony] § 32:11, pp. 118-119 [David L. Faigman et al.
eds., 2006].) Thus, the question of how probable it is that the defendant, not the
database, is the source of the crime scene DNA remains relevant. (Id. at p. 119.)
The rarity statistic addresses this question.
Id. at 66. In the treatise being quoted, however, these remarks describe an argument,
developed more fully below, for using the unadjusted random-match probability instead of
the adjusted probability. If "the database is not on trial," then the probability that an
innocent database would be incriminated by the trawl is irrelevant and confusing. Yet, the
Nelson opinion asserts that the adjusted statistic might be admissible along with the
normal random-match probability. See id. at 66 n.3. This suggestion is discussed infra Part
III.B.
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it conveys the meaning of the match in the applicable context. 47
Whether the random-match probability, or any other statistic, is
admissible to explain the meaning of one or more matches resulting
from trawling a database depends on how well the statistic serves as
an indicator of the probative value of the match that comes from the
trawl. That the frequency or random-match probability is suitable in
a confirmation case is not enough to justify its use in a trawl case. As
the NRC committees and other commentators have contended, there
is a logical difference between a confirmation and a trawl match.
1 41
That logical difference must be considered before one can conclude
that the random-match probability is a valid and fair measure of
probative value in trawl cases. We will have to venture into the
statistical thicket after all. Only then can we discern whether an
adjustment to the random-match probability is required in the case of
a trawl, and if so, what it should be.
II. TRAWLING IN DATABASES: PROBATIVE VALUE
By avoiding the merits of the statistical debate over the effect of
a database trawl, the opinions in Jenkins, Johnson, and Nelson are
vulnerable to the criticism, developed in Part I, that they allow the
use of a statistic that is helpful in the confirmation setting but
irrelevant or misleading in the trawl situation. This Part rebuts that
criticism. It directly confronts the claim that a trawl necessitates an
adjustment to the random-match probability if the statistic is to be a
valid indicator of probative value. Recognizing that there is a
logically important distinction between trawl cases and confirmation
cases, the analysis builds on a fundamental result in probability
theory, Bayes' rule, to demonstrate that the frequency or random-
match probability is as useful in trawl cases as it is in confirmation
ones. To reach this conclusion, Section A provides a more complete
explanation of the frequentist skepticism about the probative value of
147. See D. H. Kaye, The Role of Race in DNA Evidence: What Experts Say, What
California Courts Allow, 37 S.W. L. REV. 303, 311-13 (2008) (explaining how jurors can
use DNA statistics).
148. See, e.g., DAVID J. BALDING, WEIGHT-OF-EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC DNA
PROFILES 36 (2005) (contending that "DNA evidence is usually slightly stronger in the
database search setting than when no search has occurred"); NRC I, supra note 15, at 124
("The distinction between finding a match between an evidence sample and a suspect
sample and finding a match between an evidence sample and one of many entries in a
DNA profile databank is important."); NRC II, supra note 16, at 134 ("There is an
important difference [when] the suspect is initially identified by searching a database to
find a DNA profile matching that left at a crime scene."); supra note 80 and accompanying
text.
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a match that comes from a database trawl. Section B outlines the
version of Bayes' rule that shows why the frequentist concern is
misplaced in this context. Sections C and D use the mathematical
formalism to compare the impact of trawling in various situations to a
single, confirmation match. Section E defends the Bayesian analysis
against some possible objections.
A. The Dangers of Multiple Hypothesis Testing
Statisticians are taught to be wary of "multiple hypothesis
testing," "searching for significance," "ascertainment bias," or "data
mining." '149 The process of subjecting drugs to clinical trials before
accepting them as effective illustrates the problem. The best clinical
trial is a randomized, controlled, double-blind experiment. 1" ° Patients
are randomly divided into control and treatment groups.'51 The
control patients are given a harmless placebo, while the treated
patients receive the experimental drug. 152 To avoid any bias, during
the trial period neither the subjects nor the researchers know which
patients are in which group.'53 If there is a significant difference in
the outcomes experienced by the treated patients as compared to the
controls, then the statistical hypothesis test rejects the "null
hypothesis," and we can conclude that the drug is effective.'54
149. E.g., DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 427 (5th ed. 2006).
150. See, e.g., HANS ZEISEL & DAVID KAYE, PROVE IT WITH FIGURES: EMPIRICAL
METHODS IN LAW AND LITIGATION 2-3 (1997); cf. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2008) (describing
"[a]dequate and well-controlled studies" for the "purpose of conducting clinical
investigations of a drug" as required by the FDA for marketing approval and stating in
§ 314.126(e) that "[u]ncontrolled studies or partially controlled studies are not acceptable
as the sole basis for the approval of claims of effectiveness"); DONALD A. BERRY,
STATISTICS: A BAYESIAN PERSPECTIVE 68 (1996) ("Randomization has obvious virtues
in medical research."); Stuart J. Pocock & Diane R. Elbourne, Randomized Trials or
Observational Tribulations?, 342 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1907, 1908 (2000).
151. E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(4); MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 149, at 200-03;
Philip W. Lavori et al., Designs for Experiments: Parallel Comparison of Treatment, in
MEDICAL USES OF STATISTICS 61, 61 (John C. Bailar III & Frederick Mosteller eds., 2d
ed. 1992).
152. MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 149, at 200; Lavori et al., supra note 151, at 61.
This is the simplest experimental design. Many variations are possible. For example,
investigators can create additional treatment groups to test for dosage effects. E.g., 21
C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(ii).
153. MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 149, at 206; cf. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(5)
(requiring "[a]dequate measures ... to minimize bias on the part of the subjects,
observers, and analysts of the data, ... such as blinding"); ZEISEL & KAYE, supra note
150, at 109 (concluding that "the double-blind rule constitutes a requirement of good,
controlled experimentation with human subjects").
154. MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 149, at 203,424.
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There is no single, agreed-upon threshold for how much of a
difference is needed to accept the claim of efficacy. 155 Even if a drug
has no therapeutic value, random assignment of patients to each
group sometimes places in the treatment group more patients who
show improvement for reasons unrelated to the drug. To avoid
declaring too many "false positives" in clinical trials, statisticians
assume that the drug accomplishes nothing and compute the
probability of seeing a difference as large or larger than the one
actually observed in a clinical trial given that the differences reflect
only the variation due to the random assignment of patients to the
two groups. 5 6 If we demand that this probability-a p-value-be less
than 0.05, then, in the long run, we will falsely declare efficacious no
more than one in twenty drugs that go through clinical trials. 57
Why 0.05? This particular level usually is taken to denote
statistical significance because of the remarks and tables of the
eminent British statistician, Sir Ronald Fisher.158  But the choice is
somewhat arbitrary. If an expected false-positive error frequency of
one in twenty seems too high, we can adopt a lower (more
155. E.g., id. at 424.
156. James H. Ware et al., P Values, in MEDICAL USES OF STATISTICS, 181,183 (John
C. Bailar III & Frederick Mosteller eds., 2.d ed. 1992).
157. See, e.g., MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 149, at 438; Ware, supra note 156, at 189
(describing the 0.05 level).
158. Sir Ronald Fisher, a statistician and geneticist at the agricultural experiment
station at Rothamsted, England, was the father of the randomized experiment, the general
use of regression, and the mathematical derivation of the probability distributions of
several important test statistics. JOAN FISHER BOX, R. A. FISHER: THE LIFE OF A
SCIENTIST 113, 140 (1978). He was not the originator of tests of significance, but his
writings on statistics in scientific research were exceedingly influential. See, e.g., MOORE
& MCCABE, supra note 149, at 425 ("One reason for the common use of... 0.05 is the
great influence of Sir R. A. Fisher."). Fisher wrote:
[I]t is convenient to draw the line at about the level at which we can say: "Either
there is something in the treatment, or a coincidence has occurred such as does not
occur more than once in twenty trials." ... If one in twenty does not seem high
enough odds, we may, if we prefer it, draw the line at one in fifty (the 2 per cent.
point), or one in a hundred (the 1 per cent. point). Personally, the writer prefers
to set a low standard of significance at the 5 per cent. point, and ignore entirely all
results which fail to reach that level. A scientific fact should be regarded as
experimentally established only if a properly designed experiment rarely fails to
give this level of significance.
R.A. Fisher, The Arrangement of Field Experiments. 33 J. MINISTRY AGRIC. OF GR. BRIT.
503, 504 (1926) (emphasis omitted). As one contemporary statistician has remarked:
"There you have it. Fisher thought 5% was about right, and who was there to disagree
with the master?" DAVID MOORE, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 292
(1979). For a more complete analysis of Fisher's remarks, see Gerard E. Dallal, Why
P=O.05?, http://www.jerrydallal.com/LHSP/p05.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2008).
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demanding) number. The essential point is that the significance level
indicates the false-positive probability. Or rather, it is supposed to.
There are ways to cheat.
Imagine an unscrupulous pharmaceutical company-the Evil
Company-bent on "proving" that its newest miracle drug cures
cancer. It commissions twenty randomized, controlled experiments
with the drug. In each of these parallel clinical trials, the
investigators, patients, or referring physicians think that they are
participating in the only trial of the drug. In each trial, fifty patients
are assigned to the control group and fifty to the treatment group. In
the absence of the drug, the chance of remission is known to be 1/4.
The twenty independent and isolated experiments are conducted. In
one trial, there were nine more remissions in the treated patients than
in the controls. All the other group differences were less than eight,
and in all the trials combined, only twenty of the treated patients did
better than the controls. Knowing all this, the hypothesis tester
would conclude that even though the one reported trial is significant
at the 0.05 level,159 the p-value for all twenty trials combined is 0.30,
which does not even approach significance. 160 The Evil Company,
however, suppresses the nineteen negative findings and submits the
one statistically significant finding to the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA"). A hoodwinked agency approves the drug.
In this hypothetical case, the nominal significance level of 0.05
greatly overstates the value of the positive finding when all twenty
trials are considered. When we correct for the trawl through all the
experiments, we realize that the evidence as a whole is not
impressive. It would be somewhat surprising to find a significant
difference in the first and only clinical trial if the drug were totally
ineffective; however, it is not at all surprising to discover an apparent
effect-a "hit"-in one or more of the twenty clinical trials. In fact,
159. Let Xi be the observed number of remissions in the treatment group and X2 be the
number in the control group. Under the null hypothesis, X and X2 are binomially
distributed with n = 50 and 0 = 0.25. Their difference X, - X2 is approximately normal with
mean 0 and standard deviation u = [2n0(1-0)]" = 4.33. If the alternative to the null
hypothesis is that the drug could be either effective or detrimental, then any difference I Xi
- X21 > 1.96a = 8.49 is significant at the 0.05 level. If it is known that the drug cannot make
things worse, then any difference of more than 1.64.a = 7.10 in favor of the treatment group
is significant at the 0.05 level.
160. Pooling the trials means that the standard deviation of the difference in the
remissions is [2(1000)(1/4)(3/4)]" = 19.37. Hence, z = 20/19.37 = 1.03. About 30% of the
area under the standard normal curve lies in the corresponding tails. This is the two-tailed
p-value, which is used if we cannot be sure in advance of the experiments that the drug can
only be beneficial. The one-tailed p-value is 0.15, which also is not significant at the 0.05
level.
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the Evil Company's strategy of presenting only the significant results
is even more likely to produce a false positive than the pooled p-value
of 0.30 suggests. The probability of at least one significant result in
twenty can be computed in three easy steps: (1) the chance that there
will not be a hit for a useless drug in each independent trial is 1 - .05,
or 95%; (2) the chance of no hit for all twenty trials is therefore .9520 =
.36; and (3) the chance of one or more hits is the remaining
probability, 1 - .36 = .64. In other words, if we were to declare as
effective those drugs that show an apparently significant effect at the
0.05 level-when, unbeknownst to us, the ineffective drugs are tested
twenty times to find at least one such outcome-we would err 64% of
the time. Because we have repeatedly "tested" the null hypothesis,
the significance level used in the individual test is a misleading
indicator of the false-positive error rate of our decision procedure.
The true significance level is 0.64-a far cry from the nominal 0.05.
Of course, the Evil Company is but a dagger of the mind, a false
creation. 16' But this sort of thing happens inadvertently. It is known
as publication bias. 62 Not knowing of unpublished negative findings,
researchers may be condemned to repeat other people's experiments
until, at last, a "significant" difference emerges in a single experiment
that sees the light of day.
Cognizant of this type of threat to conventional hypothesis tests,
the NAS committees treated the random-match probability as though
it were a p-value for the one clinical trial cherry-picked by the Evil
Company. The 1992 committee worried that "[i]f a pattern has a
frequency of 1 in 10,000, there would still be a considerable
probability (about 10%) of seeing it by chance in a databank of 1,000
people.' ' 163 The 1996 committee offered a similar example:
[If we toss 20 reputedly unbiased coins once each, there is
roughly one chance in a million that all 20 will show heads.
According to standard statistical logic, the occurrence of this
highly unlikely event would be regarded as evidence
discrediting the hypothesis that the coins are unbiased. But if
we repeat this experiment of 20 tosses a large enough number
of times, there will be a high probability that all 20 coins will
show heads in at least one experiment. In that case, an event of
161. Or is it? See News in Brief: British Government to Demand Clinical Trial Data,
452 NATURE 141, 141 (2008); Drummond Rennie, When Evidence Isn't: Trials, Drug
Companies and the FDA, 15 J. L. & POL'Y 991, 1002-03 (2007).
162. Susan J. Landers, Study Focuses on Publication Bias in Journals, AM. MED. NEWS,
Feb. 18. 2008, http://www.ama-assn.orgamednews/2008/02/18/hlsbO2l8.htm.
163. NRC I, supra note 15, at 124.
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20 heads would not be unusual and would not in itself be judged
as evidence that the coins are biased. The initial identification
of a suspect through a search of a DNA database is analogous
to performing the coin-toss experiment many times: A match
by chance alone is more likely the larger the number of profiles
examined.' 64
The committees differed not over the need to adjust for the
trawl, but only over which method for adjusting was more practical.
As we saw in Part I, the 1992 report proposed retesting with new loci
to get a new number (prom) for the random-match probability (the
limit-the-loci approach), and the 1996 report described a statistical
adjustment (multiplying by n) to the probability already on hand (the
np rule).165 Both methods are straightforward, and both increase the
random-match probability p by many orders of magnitude, making
the match seem less impressive to a jury. 166
Knowing the expected frequency of matches in an innocent
database-one that does not include the true source of the crime-
scene DNA-is useful for some purposes, and the value of np conveys
a sense of how frequently trawls of innocent databases will produce
matches. This untoward outcome has occurred at least once. In 2000,
when the British database contained 660,000 DNA records, a
Manchester man was linked to a burglary by a six-locus STR match. 167
The random-match probability was said to be one in thirty-seven
164. Id. at 134.
165. Although the 1996 report's analysis is more elaborate, the basic statistical
reasoning behind its proposed correction is similar to our example of the twenty clinical
trials of the useless anti-cancer drug. The idea is to consider how many times the
apparently unlikely event had the chance to occur. Assume that the database of size n is
composed entirely of unrelated people who have no involvement with the crime in
question. Then the chance that the first individual trawled will match is just the random-
match probability p. This also is the chance of a match on the second try, the third, and so
on, for all n tries. The chance that any given individual will not match is therefore 1 -p;
the resulting chance that no one will match is (1 - p)'. Hence, the chance that someone
will match-even though all n are innocent-is 1 - (1 -p)'. This is the p-value adjusted for
the trawl. The adjustment is the same as the one used in the example of the twenty clinical
trials. If p is close to zero and n is very large, then (1 - p)' is approximately 1 - np.
Substituting this value in the previous expression 1 - (1 -p)' establishes that the chance of
at least one person in the database of innocent people matching the crime-scene sample is
1 - (1 - np) = np. We have arrived at the committee's np rule.
166. The committee recommended multiplying instead of reducing the depth of the
database trawl (by using fewer loci) to avoid the possibility that "[i]f the amount of DNA
in the evidence sample is too small, following the recommendation in the 1992 report
could leave too few additional loci for computing a match probability." NRC I, supra note
15, at 134.
167. Richard Willing, Mismatch Calls DNA Tests into Question, USA TODAY, Feb. 8,
2000, at 3A.
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million, but the suspect had an excellent alibi.1"8 When the STR
typing was extended to ten loci, he was excluded.'69 Although a
spokesman for the British database tried to explain that "[t]here's no
cause for alarm," the case sent shock waves through the DNA testing
community, which "fear[ed] that the error might prompt thousands of
people convicted through DNA testing to appeal their convictions. "'17
In fact, the incident showed no error in either the DNA typing or
the estimate of the random-match probability. What it did show was
that p understates the chance that, sooner or later, an innocent
person's DNA will match. The product np is 66/3700, which is about
1/56. If the one-in-thirty-seven-million figure is typical of the six-
locus random-match probability for the profiles in the database, then
statistically one should expect a match about one time in fifty-six
when the database (i.e., everyone in it) is innocent of the crime being
investigated. The real surprise is that no six-locus matches to
innocent people were seen in any of the hundreds or thousands of
earlier trawls of the database. Yet, the manager of the FBI's national
DNA index system, NDIS, found the incident "mind-blowing.' 171
The British experience shows that when considering how often
database trawls will generate cold hits in databases that do not
contain the true source, the frequentist perspective of the NRC
committees makes sense. Even with perfect laboratory testing, unless
the DNA type is unique, trawling innocent databases eventually will
produce false matches more often than the random-match probability
would suggest. But it does not follow that the existence of a trawl
degrades the probative value of the evidence against the defendant.
The next Section presents an intuitive explanation of this apparent
paradox.
B. The Bayesian Rejoinder
To probe-and undermine-the intuition that a database trawl
produces less powerful evidence than a confirmation match, consider
two cases. In Case I, the defendant was identified through a trawl
and further investigation produced confirmatory evidence. In Case
II, the same confirmatory evidence was known at the outset, making
the defendant a suspect. The police did not bother to secure a DNA






NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87
STR genotype was already included in the state's convicted-offender
database. To be on the safe side, rather than just compare the crime-
scene genotypes to the defendant's record in the database, they
ordered a full search through the database. This search showed that
the defendant matched and that no one else did. The only difference
between the package of evidence in the two cases is the order in
which it was uncovered. 72 In Case I, the police trawled, then
"confirmed." In Case II, they "confirmed," then trawled. It is hard
to see why the evidence in Case I is any less probative than that in
Case 11.173
In understanding the impact of a database trawl in a criminal
investigation, these hypothetical cases are more salient than the
chicanery of the Evil Company because they focus on the critical legal
question about the evidence in a trawl case. The frequentist objection
to the random-match probability in a trawl case is that the probability
is a misleading, nominal p-value that should be replaced by an
172. In the trawl-first case there is the possibility that "the subsequently discovered
evidence was tainted by suggestiveness, given that the DNA match motivated the police,
and possibly witnesses as well, to confirm the suggestion that the perpetrator had been
found." Donnelly & Friedman, supra note 12, at 959. The hypothetical in the text
excludes this possibility. When it does occur, the nongenetic evidence is not identical in
both cases. An eyewitness identification in a lineup tainted by knowledge of which person
in the line-up has matching DNA is not the same as an eyewitness identification in a
properly conducted lineup. This indicates that police should guard against tainting the
nongenetic evidence in this fashion and that defense counsel should be alert to the
possibility so that they can expose it at trial. Richard Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning
DNA as Criminal Identification Evidence: With Thanks to the Reverend Bayes, 13
CARDOZO L. REv. 303, 319 (1991).
Another possible complication is that the subsequent investigation in the trawl-
first case might produce more evidence than an ordinary investigation. Without the lead
from the trawl, the police might have expended their limited resources in a more diffuse
and less effective investigation and, hence, have acquired less adequate or complete
nongenetic evidence. But this modification of the hypothetical case in the text does not
mean that a match in the database is weaker evidence than a DNA match to an existing
suspect. It simply means that the other evidence in the case might differ depending on
when a DNA match is obtained, and it suggests that trawling first can be a good
investigative strategy.
173. Professor Ronald Allen pointed out to me one way in which Case I could be more
persuasive. It turns on the possibility that the databank does not contain DNA from the
individual whose DNA was left at the crime-scene but does contain a sample from an
identical twin. In these rare situations, the twin will emerge as a suspect from the database
trawl, and if and when some confirmatory evidence is acquired, the investigation may end.
On the other hand, if the police start by looking for nongenetic evidence, they are more
likely to focus on the correct twin in the first place. In both cases, there could be a similar
package of genetic and nongenetic evidence. This innocent-twin effect, however, is quite
different from the frequentist concern that the evidence is degraded by the many
opportunities for a match to an unrelated individual, and it is not an argument to replace
the random-match probability with np or p..*
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adjusted figure to account for the increased rate of false positives due
to the search strategy. In more common parlance, the claim is that a
jury that is not informed about the trawl and only hears about the
incredibly small estimated frequency or random-match probability
will overvalue the DNA match relative to a fully informed jury that
knows about the trawl and the frequency of errors when searching
large databases.'74 In the case of the Evil Company, the nominal p-
value was misleading and an adjustment was required because the
evidence was not simply the data in one controlled experiment. It
was the data from that clinical trial plus nineteen others. One
solution there would be to inform the FDA of all the results so that it
can evaluate all the evidence about the drug, not just a selected part
of it. As we saw with a few simple calculations, this would put the
totality of evidence within the normal range expected under the null
hypothesis.
When we ask about the impact of the additional evidence on a
match from a DNA database trawl, however, we find that the effect is
very different. This Section will show that a jury that learns that the
match comes from the trawl should not regard the match as less
significant than the same match in a confirmation case.
Consequently, presenting the random-match probability and ignoring
the fact that it came from a search is not prejudicial to the defendant.
To establish this result, it is helpful to approach this question in two
steps. First, we consider what the import of the DNA evidence would
be if it consisted only of the one match between the defendant's DNA
and the crime-scene sample (because he was the only person tested).
Then, we compare the impact of the match when the data from the
trawl are added to give the full picture. In the case of the Evil
Company, the omitted evidence made it less probable that the drug
was effective. In the database trawl case, however, we will find the
opposite effect. If anything, the omitted evidence makes it more
probable that the defendant is the source. On reflection, this result is
entirely natural. When there is a trawl, the DNA evidence is more
complete. It includes not only the fact that the defendant matches,
but also the fact that other people were tested and did not match.
The more people who are excluded, the more probable it is that any
one of the remaining individuals-including the defendant-is the
source. Compared to testing only the defendant, trawling a database
174. The reason not to disclose the trawl to the jury is that doing so could prejudice the
defendant by revealing that he engaged in conduct that triggered his inclusion in a law
enforcement database. Of course, when evidence of the defendant's prior crimes are
admissible for other purposes, the concern evaporates.
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that includes individuals who could have committed the crime
therefore increases the probability that the defendant is the source.
A database search is generally more probative than a single-suspect
search.
The remainder of this Section applies some basic ideas from
probability theory and presents numerical examples to buttress this
intuition. The theory is Bayesian in that it conceives of an idealized
juror's degree of belief in the proposition that the defendant left the
crime-scene DNA as conforming to the laws of probability, 75 and it
assumes that probability theory pertains to unique events and
hypotheses about those events.176 Despite the need to introduce a
number of symbols for the sake of clarity and conciseness, no
advanced mathematics is necessary. Basic algebra provides an
informal proof of the claim that, contrary to the perception in the
media of "a national problem" with "numbers that exaggerate the
significance of DNA matches in 'cold hit' cases"' and the defense
arguments in cases like Puckett,7' a cold hit in a suitable database
should be at least as convincing as a confirmation match. After
defining some notation, I describe a more general version of Bayes'
rule (a formula involving conditional probabilities) than is typically
seen in the legal literature. I apply this formula to assess the impact
of a database trawl on the central proposition in DNA cases-
whether the defendant is the source of the crime-scene DNA.
Despite the frequentist insight that (for profiles that are not
unique) a vast number of database trawls will lead to more DNA
175. See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 33, at 1035 (referring to an "ideal juror" in this
way).
176. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye, What is Bayesianism?, in PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES AND LIMITS OF BAYESIANISM 1 (Peter Tillers & Eric
D. Green eds., 1988). This Bayesian treatment is developed elsewhere more exhaustively
for trace evidence (items or marks left at crime-scenes) generally, but the more rigorous
presentations can be quite technical. E.g., A. P. Dawid & J. Mortera, Coherent Analysis of
Forensic Identification Evidence, 58 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y (SERIES B) 425 (1996)
(analyzing with mathematical sophistication the effect of trace evidence on the proposition
that an individual is the source of the evidence). For Bayesian analyses specific to DNA
traces, see, for example, Balding, supra note 11, at 470-72, and see generally David J.
Balding & Peter Donnelly, Evaluating DNA Profile Evidence When the Suspect is
Identified Through a Database Search, 41 J. FORENSIC SCI. 603 (1996), and David J.
Balding & Richard A. Nichols, DNA Profile Match Probability Calculation: How to Allow
for Population Stratification, Relatedness, Database Selection and Single Bands, 64
FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 125 (1994). Expositions written for nonscientists include Balding,
supra note 11, at 472, Donnelly & Friedman, supra note 12, and Walsh & Buckleton, supra
note 22.
177. Felch & Dolan, supra note 4.
178. Id.
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matches to innocent people than the random-match probability would
suggest,'79 the Bayesian analysis shows that a match coming out of a
trawl increases the probability that the defendant so identified is the
source of the DNA in question at least as much as does a match to an
individual who came to the attention of the police for other reasons.
This finding demonstrates that the frequentist concern with multiple
testing notwithstanding, the random-match probability is as good an
indication of probative value in the trawl case is it is in a confirmation
case. To facilitate the analysis, we start with some definitions.
1. The Ingredients
Bayesian analysis of evidence always uses five concepts: events,
hypotheses, prior probabilities, likelihoods, and posterior
probabilities. With DNA evidence, one critical event is that the
defendant has the same DNA genotype as that associated with the
crime. This matching individual can be labeled "Io.""' Of course, the
defendant is not the only possibility; before considering the detailed
evidence in a case, jurors must regard many other individuals in the
general population as possible sources. The nature of this "suspect
population" is discussed more fully in later Sections. At this point, we
simply note that everyone in the relevant population of N people can
be listed by a name Ij, where j goes from 0 to N - 1.181
Corresponding to each person is the hypothesis Sj, which states
that Ij is the true source. If the relevant population is the entire
world, then based on our background information about the world
and any other (nongenetic) evidence in the case, every person has
some probability Pr(S) = 7r, of being the source. This is a "prior
probability." It applies before we consider the DNA evidence.
Individuals who are on the other side of the globe or the wrong sex
179. Id. (quoting Stanford mathematician, Keith Devlin, for the view that "[i]t is only a
matter of time until someone is wrongfully convicted because of this").
180. I use this odd name because such nomenclature leads to a compact way to refer to
everyone in the population of N possible suspects (which could consist of almost everyone
in the world). More than one individual might match, especially if the crime scene
contains so little DNA that only a few alleles can be detected. Such situations are not
analyzed here.
181. The capital N, which stands for population size, should not be confused with n,
which is the database size. Indeed, we can think of the confirmation case as a degenerate
database case in which a "database" of size n = 1 consists of the suspect's DNA profile.
This also reminds us that the issue is not limited to trawls through pre-established
databases. In principle, it arises every time investigators test and look at the DNA types
of more than one individual to compare them to the crime-scene DNA profile.
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would have prior probabilities near zero.18 An individual selected for
DNA matching based on other, independent evidence should have a
higher prior probability than someone who is tested for no other
reason than that his DNA profile is on file.
So far, we have enumerated the hypotheses of interest-the ones
that answer the question, "Who is the source of the crime-scene
DNA?" Now we refer to the events that have occurred as E.183 The
DNA evidence E in a pure confirmation case (only one person's
DNA has been compared to the crime-scene sample) is the match to
/h. This event (denoted as E1 = M0)'" has a probability of arising
under each of the N hypotheses. More generally, the evidence E is
E,, where n is the size of the database that has been searched. For n >
1, this evidence consists of the match to defendant and the exclusion
of everyone else in the database: E, = M, & X & ... & X_I.
Colloquially, "likelihood" is synonymous with "probability" but
it has a more specialized meaning here. For a given item or body of
evidence, the likelihood varies across the hypotheses Sj. When
evidence is more probable under one hypothesis than another, the
hypothesis that makes the evidence more probable is said to have a
greater "likelihood." The likelihood L0 involving the match to the
defendant is the probability of the DNA data computed on the
assumption that the defendant is the source. Since the defendant is
sure to have the same genotypes if he is the source, the probability of
the evidence E given So in the simple confirmation case is L0 =
Pr(EISO) = 1.185 The likelihood for each hypothesis is Lj = Pr(E ISj). 186
182. For simplicity, it will be convenient to treat individuals who apparently could not
have committed the crime (astronauts in orbit at the relevant time, musicians who were
performing onstage, and so on) as if their prior probability is zero. This reduces the size N
of the initial population. The purist alternative is to keep the population extremely
inclusive but give many people miniscule prior probabilities that reflect such unlikely
possibilities as a plot to place a look-alike of the astronaut in orbit.
183. I use E interchangeably with "evidence," although technically, the evidence in
court is a report about these events. Such reports can be in error, and a more detailed
study would model this possibility. Inasmuch as this complication does not affect the
conclusions here, however, I shall put it to the side.
184. Mo simply refers to a match, (M) to Jo. An exclusion (X) of Io would be denoted
Xo.
185. This assumes that the laboratory has correctly identified all the genotypes in both
samples.
186. More precisely, the likelihood is defined so as to be proportional to the
conditional probability. Because the proportionality constant cancels out of the equations
needed here, we can ignore it.
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There is a logical difference between the likelihood L0 = Pr(ElS0)
and its transpose, Pr(S0 1E1). s7 The transposed probability is called a
"posterior probability," because it arises after the evidence E is
obtained. Evidence tending to establish a defendant's guilt increases
the prior probability of guilt to a higher level, while evidence tending
to show innocence produces a lower posterior probability. The
posterior probability that any individual I is the source is abbreviated
as 7j' = Pr(SjlE1). Thus, the posterior probability that Io is the source
can be written as 7r0' = Pr(S01El). More generally (for a trawl through
a database of size n), this posterior probability is zr0' = Pr(S01E,).
These five ingredients-events, hypotheses, prior probabilities,
likelihoods, and posterior probabilities-are interrelated. Bayes' rule
is a recipe for combining them to arrive at the posterior probability
that any individual is the source of the crime-scene DNA. In most
legal writing, a version that uses only two hypotheses is presented. 88
We need to be more comprehensive to solve the database-trawl
puzzle, for there are many hypotheses Sj to assess. Even so, Bayes'
rule remains fairly simple.
2. The Recipes
Bayes' rule expresses how an item of evidence shifts the prior
probabilities assigned to a set of hypotheses. The formula instructs us
to weight each prior probability by its likelihood and to combine
these weighted prior probabilities to obtain the posterior
probabilities. An example will convey the basic idea. Suppose we
take all the hearts from a standard deck of playing cards and shuffle
them well. We draw one card and give it to a friend to view. What is
the probability that it is a king? I will abbreviate this possibility as CK,
for "card is a king." Since there is one king in the reduced deck of
thirteen hearts and it is as likely to be drawn as any other card, the
prior probability is Pr(CK) = 1/13. Now we learn something more
about the card-our friend (who never errs or lies) assures us that it is
a picture card. This evidence E raises the probability. The revised
probability is Pr(CKIE), the conditional probability that the card is a
king given that it is a picture card. It is just the proportion of picture
187. In the special case of 7ro = 1h and small Pr(EIlSo), the naive transposition is
approximately correct. A.P. Dawid, The Island Problem: Coherent Use of Identification
Evidence, in ASPECTS OF UNCERTAINTY: A TRIBUTE TO D. V. LINDLEY 159, 160 (P.R.
Freedman & A.F.M. Smith eds., 1994).
188. See, e.g., Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 34, at 498; David H. Kaye, DNA
Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics and the Courts, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 101, 165
(1993); Tribe, supra note 34, at 1353.
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cards that are kings, which is 1/3. The evidence has raised the prior
probability irK = 1/13 to the posterior probability rK' = 1/3.
This card problem is simple enough that we can compute the
posterior probability directly (by counting the number of picture
cards). In more complicated cases, we can use Bayes' rule written out
in terms of the prior probabilities and likelihoods for all the cards.
The rule states that the posterior probability of the hypothesis of
interest is
posterjol = prior x likelihood for kjpothasis of interest (1)
sum of all (priors x likelihoods)
In the card problem, the probability that a king has been drawn
given that a picture card has been drawn is (a) the likelihood for a
king weighted by the prior probability divided by (b) a weighted sum
of the likelihoods for all the cards (the weights being the prior
probabilities).
To verify that the rule works, we need to know the priors and the
likelihoods. At the outset, every card has the same chance of being
picked. Since all the priors have the same value, they cancel out of
equation (1). The equation thus simplifies to 7rj' = LK / [Li + ... + Ll0
+ L~ack + LQueen + LK]. The likelihood of the hypothesis that the card is
a king is the probability of the evidence (a picture card) given the
hypothesis that it is a king: LK = Pr(EICK) =1. The likelihood for the
two other picture cards, a jack and a queen, is the same. Because
cards one through ten cannot produce the report that they are a
picture card, their likelihoods are zero. We conclude that irK' = 1 / (0
+.. .+0+1+1+1)=1/3.
That Bayes' rule works in the card example is no surprise since
the formula is easily derived from the axioms and definitions of
probability theory. Furthermore, Bayes' theorem is uncontroversial
in this trivial card game because objective probabilities can be
attached to the events or hypotheses. But the rule also can be applied
to subjective probabilities 89 or to degrees of belief about propositions
of fact. 9°
189. LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 30 (2d ed., Dover
Publications 1972) (1954); Peter C. Fishburn, The Axioms of Subjective Probability, 1
STAT. Sci. 335, 335 (1986).
190. RICHARD C. JEFFREY, THE LOGIC OF DECISION 184-86 (2d ed. 1983); D.V.
LINDLEY, MAKING DECISIONS 45-46 (2d ed. 1985). Bayesian statisticians are more
eclectic than their frequentist colleagues in the sense that they are willing to extend the
domain of probability beyond events that are governed by physical random processes.
They do not claim that the personal beliefs of real people actually conform to the
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A version of Bayes' rule for a DNA match is
posterior = prior x lkelihood for defendant (2)
ior x likelihood for defendant + sum of all (pnors x likelihoods for everbody else)
The denominator contains all the weighted likelihoods, but they
are broken into two groups-the one for the defendant and those for
everybody else. The formula applies to trawl cases and confirmation
cases alike.
3. The Dishes
We now show that learning about the results of the database
search as opposed to learning only that the defendant matches does
not lower the posterior probability that the defendant is the source.
Only a verbal sketch of the mathematical reasoning is given here. A
more explicit derivation is provided in the appendix.
We begin by putting the likelihoods in the denominator in a
useful order. The weighted likelihood for the defendant goes first,
followed by the terms for everyone else in the database, followed by
the terms from the untested portion of the population. The posterior
probability becomes:
posterior = prior x likelihood for suspect (3)prior x likelihood for suspect
+ sum of (priors x likelihoods for ever yone else in database)
+ sum of (priors x likelihoods for untested individuals)
The crucial observation about (3) is that the sum of the weighted
priors for everyone in the database drops out of the equation.19' The
probability calculus anymore than accountants claim that everyone adds up numbers
correctly. Rather, they maintain that people should follow Bayes' rule in articulating their
degrees of beliefs-just as they should follow the rules of arithmetic in adding numbers or
the rules of deductive logic in evaluating the truth of propositions. Thus, one argument
for treating degrees of belief as conforming to the axioms of probability theory (and
hence, Bayes' rule) is that only this procedure assigns the same degrees of belief to
logically equivalent propositions. For instance, only degrees of belief that act like
probabilities will produce mutually consistent assessments of propositions, such as: "It is
not the case that both A and B are true," and, "Either not-A is true or not-B is true." See
generally, BRIAN SKYRMS, CHOICE AND CHANCE: AN INTRODUcTION TO INDUCTIVE
LOGIC (4th ed. 2000).
191. This setup assumes that the database is nested inside the suspect population. Real
databases include samples from offenders who are behind bars and could not be the
perpetrators of new crimes in the outside world. They may even include individuals who
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trawl tells us that, within the database, only the defendant has the
matching genotype. Some untested individuals might share that
genotype, but everyone else in the database has been excluded.
Therefore, the probability that a tested individual Ij would have
genotypes that are inconsistent with the crime-scene stain when this
person is the source is Li = 0. As such, (3) simplifies to:
i =prior x likelihood for suspect
posterior - {prior x likelihood for suspect "* (4)
1+ sum of (priors x likelihoods for untested indiduals)J
We are ready to compare the posterior probability of So knowing
that there has been a database search to the probability based on the
mistaken assumption that there has been no trawl (and everyone else
in the population is untested). If the priors are the same in both
situations, the only thing that changes in (4) is the number of
weighted likelihoods that are added up in the sum for the untested
individuals. Searching a database reduces the number of untested
individuals. For instance, a trawl through a database of size one
hundred that includes the defendant moves ninety-nine individuals
from the "untested" category into the "database" category-where
they are excluded. Their weighted likelihoods disappear from the
denominator. A smaller denominator means a bigger fraction.
Because of this "denominator effect," the trawl increases the
posterior probability even more than a confirmation match to a single
suspect.
The denominator effect is miniscule when the database is a tiny
part of the population. In the limit, as the database grows to
encompass the whole population, however, the sum of the weighted
likelihoods from outside the database goes to zero. All that remains
in the denominator is the weighted likelihood for the defendant. The
posterior probability becomes one-just as we would expect when
everyone in the population except for the defendant has been
excluded.
Based on this reasoning about the effect of excluding everyone
except for the defendant in a large database, it seems perverse to
are dead but whose records have not been purged. When evidence from a decades-old
crime is tested, young offenders who could not possibly have committed the crime will be
in the database. Mathematically, this is not a problem. One can define the suspect
population very liberally and assign prior probabilities that are approximately zero to the
unrealistic "suspects." Alternatively, one can drop these people from the "suspect
population" and reduce the offender database size n accordingly.
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inflate the random-match probability. When one considers the actual
DNA evidence in the trawl case-that the defendant matches and no
one else does-we can be more confident that the defendant, to the
exclusion of everyone else in the world, is the source of the stain.
Consequently, "[n]o downward adjustment in the force of the
evidence is appropriate.
192
C. Reconciling Conflicting Frequentist and Bayesian Intuitions
The discussion so far has shown that the extended search for a
significant result degrades the probative value of the "significant"
finding in the cancer-drug case but not, it seems, in the hit in the
DNA database trawl. Several factors underlie this divergence.
Clearly, it is wrong for the Evil Company to search for significance
and then to present the one instance of a small p-value as if there had
been no search. The reason is simple: the omitted information
contradicts the company's claim of therapeutic effectiveness. In
contrast, if all the other clinical trials were consistent with the
company's claim, the failure to mention them would not prejudice the
case for approving the drug. The trawl case is similar to a series of
successful clinical trials, all rejecting the null hypothesis for the
nominal p-values. The additional evidence-that everyone else in the
database is excluded-is consistent with the claim of defendant's
guilt. The lack of other hits in the database trawl therefore has an
effect opposite to that of the lack of other significant differences in
the clinical trials. It supplies compatible rather than contradictory
data. There is no paradox in stating that ascertainment bias is a
problem when testing drugs but not when looking for matches for
identification in a database.
Likewise, the database trawl differs from the coin-tossing
example in the 1996 NRC report. There, the sequences of twenty
tosses that do not yield streaks of heads undercut the hypothesis that
the coin is biased toward heads. A more apt analogy to a DNA
database trawl would be a search of a large room that contains fair
192. BALDING supra note 148, at 36; Donnelly & Friedman, supra note 12, at 933;
authorities cited, supra note 176. Indeed, the denominator effect is not the only thing that
increases the posterior probability. Our exposition treated the random-match probability
as a known quantity not affected by the testing in the instant case. The preceding
authorities also argue that the very failure to find additional matches in the database
increases the probability that the profile in question is truly rare, giving a second reason to
be more confident in a trawl case than in a confirmation one. Like the denominator effect,
however, this factor has only a small impact on the posterior probability.
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coins together with a few two-headed coins.'93 We draw a single coin,
toss it twenty times, and observe twenty heads. This presents
powerful evidence that the coin is two-headed. The result is certain if
the coin is two-headed, and it is almost impossible when the coin is
fair. The likelihood for the fair coin is p = 1/22, or about one in a
million; the "likelihood ratio" is then 1/(1/2°) = 220, or about a million.
The data of twenty heads are a million times more likely to arise
when the coin is two-headed than when it is a fair coin. 194
Now suppose that instead of tossing a single coin, we sample
1001 coins, toss each of them twenty times, and find that just one
exhibits twenty heads. The trawl through the coins does not make the
hypothesis that the coin is two-sided less probable. To the contrary,
excluding one thousand coins makes it more probable that the coin is
one of the remaining double-headed ones. If we fail to disclose that
we found the coin by testing many coins instead of one, we would not
be suppressing any data that undermine the contention that the coin
is two-headed. Instead, we would be understating the case for the
two-headed coin.
Yet, many people have the sense that the one-hit database search
is less diagnostic of identity than the one-hit confirmation test. In
fact, one article goes so far as to claim that "a Bayesian analysis
suggests that this evidence [from a trawl] has no probative value."' 95
According to the article's authors, "a match between the suspect and
perpetrator is nearly certain if the suspect is in fact guilty. But a
match between the suspect and perpetrator is also certain if he is not
guilty, because he was chosen based on the fact he matches."' 96 The
last statement, however, is confused or at least confusing. It seems to
be addressing the hypothesis that some unspecified individual in the
database is guilty rather than the hypothesis that a named defendant
in the database is guilty. Before the database search is conducted, it
is not certain that anyone in the database will match, let alone that a
specific, named individual-call him Mr. J-will match. Naturally, an
innocent person is likely to match if the database is large enough, if
the actual source is not in it, and if the profile is not unique to this
193. Cf. Donnelly & Friedman, supra note 12, at 950-51 (analyzing a similar problem
involving coins).
194. This likelihood ratio is an excellent measure of the probative value of evidence
with respect to two simple and complementary hypotheses like the ones in this example.
See, e.g., 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 96, at 730-32; Kaye & Koehler, supra note 108, at
648-50.
195. William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the
New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 101 (1989).
196. Id.
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individual. These conditions are what give rise to the valid
frequentist concern that, sooner or later, database trawls for
nonunique profiles will produce false hits.9'9
The Bayesian response is that the individual, not the database, is
on trial.' 98 The appropriate analysis focuses on the hypotheses 5, that
"Mr. J is the source of the crime-scene sample." Before the search,
the probability that a given J is the source will be low (if there is no
other reason to suspect him) or high (if there is other evidence
pointing to him). In either case, these prior odds will increase
dramatically as a result of the discovery that out of all the samples in
the databank only Mr. J's matches.1 9  Therefore, the database finding
has considerable probative value.
Yet, the defendant's name is only attached after the search is
over. Had Mr. K matched instead of Mr. J, he would have become
the suspect in the case. So the feeling that the trawl has not proved
much lingers. This doubt about probative value might emanate from
the fact that the posterior probability in a "naked database match"
case could be small. By a "naked match case," I mean a case like the
one noted in the introduction, where John Davis was prosecuted in
San Francisco without any other evidence of guilt (besides such
general facts as his residence and age).2"'
197. The FBI's DNA Advisory Board "continue[s] to endorse the recommendation of
the NRC II Report for the evaluation of evidence from a database search" because it finds
"the LR [likelihood ratio] espoused by Balding and Donnelly (1996)" to be
"unsatisfactory" as applied to an example involving a series of genotypes that have a
frequency of 1/100,000. DNA Advisory Board, supra note 22. The example, however,
merely establishes the same point-sooner or later, there will be false hits in a large
database.
198. See People v. Nelson, 185 P.3d 49, 66 (Cal. 2008) ("[T]he database is not on trial.
Only the defendant is.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN
ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY § 32.11 at 110, 118-19 (2006)).
199. An appendix in the 1996 NRC report distinguishes between the two hypotheses
and shows that the probability that a named individual is the source is larger following a
database trawl. NRC II, supra note 16, at 163-65. The committee offered the np
adjustment when considering the null hypothesis that no one in the database is the source
versus the alternative that someone in the database is the source. See id. at 134-35
("Suppose that we hypothesize that the evidence sample was not left by someone whose
DNA profile is in the database (or a close relative of such a person) and find that under
this hypothesis P(M) is small. The usual statistical logic then leads to rejection of that
hypothesis in favor of the alternative that (one of) the matching profile(s) in the database
comes from the person who left the evidence sample."); id. at 161 ("If one wishes to
describe the impact of the DNA evidence under the hypothesis that the source of the
evidence sample is someone in the database, then the likelihood ratio should be divided by
[n].")S200. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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The idea that the database search is less informative because
defendant was not already a suspect is misguided for two reasons. It
confuses probative value-which relates to a shift in the odds-with
the posterior odds-the odds after all the evidence is in.2"' In
addition, it compares the posterior in a case of limited evidence to the
posterior in a case of more extensive evidence. Naturally, the former
will be less than the latter, but this does not mean that limited
evidence is not probative and can be ignored. Rather, it means that,
when the investigation is over, there may be too little evidence to
warrant a conviction. Strong evidence is like a good play in football.
It moves the ball a long way down the field. But if a team takes
possession deep in its own territory, even a great play may not score a
goal. The failure to score with one item of evidence hardly means
that the evidence is weak or prejudicial. A DNA match in a trawl
case-even a naked trawl case-is no less probative than a DNA
match in a confirmation case.
To erase any residual doubt on this score, the next Section
explicitly compares the probative force of both confirmation and
trawl matches in several examples. The examples, and the more
general reasoning behind them (which is found in the Appendix),
show that trawling does not degrade the value of a match.
D. The Naked Trawl and Other Cases
A study of some examples of the impact of trawl evidence in
various situations clarifies the nature of the naked-trawl case. This
Section considers four different situations: (1) a pure confirmation
case (nongenetic information points to the defendant, he is the only
one tested, and he matches); (2) an investigate-then-trawl case (the
nongenetic information is followed by a confirming database trawl
that points only to the defendant); (3a) a trawl-then-investigate-
successfully case (the trawl points only to the defendant and is
followed by an investigation that uncovers the same confirming
nongenetic information); and (3b) a trawl-then-investigate-
unsuccessfully case (the trawl points only to the defendant and is
followed by an investigation that uncovers no confirming nongenetic
information).
I shall use a numerical example together with the physical
metaphor of a mass, or fixed quantity, of probability that must be
divided up among the hypotheses about the true source. We want to
know how much of the mass ends up on the defendant in each
201. Kaye & Koehler, supra note 108, at 654-55.
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situation. The example will illustrate how cases (2) and (3a) produce
the strongest body of evidence. Case (1) ranks next, and case (3b),
which has the least total evidence, comes in last. In every case,
however, the trawl is equally probative, again establishing that there
is no need to adjust the match probability that applies in the pure
confirmation case.
1. The Pure Confirmation Case: n = 1
When eight-year-old Alicia Wade was abducted from her
bedroom in San Diego, molested, then returned there, she did not tell
anyone. The assault only became known after she complained to her
mother that it hurt when she went to bathroom.0 2 Child Protective
Services placed Alicia in foster care.2 °3 More than a year later, she
told her psychotherapist that her father, James Wade, had attacked
her.2 4 He was charged with lewd and lascivious acts causing great
bodily injury.205 After reading the records of the therapy sessions
obtained by James's defense counsel, however, the prosecutor "was
convinced that they showed Alicia had been brainwashed" by the
therapist.20 6 He turned to the crime lab to see if it could find
something to confirm his impression. Using new equipment, a
criminalist discovered a semen stain on the girl's nightshirt that had
not been detected earlier. DNA testing excluded James as the source
of the semen.20 7
The criminal case now centered on Albert Carder, who by then
was in prison for assaulting other girls in the same neighborhood.0 8
DNA testing "showed that Carder could be the person who left the
stain" and that the random-match probability was "less than one in
three million. '29  Before the DNA test was conducted police had
202. GEORGE "WOODY" CLARKE, JUSTICE AND SCIENCE: TRIALS AND TRIUMPHS
OF DNA EVIDENCE 64 (2007).
203. Id. at 67-68.
204. Id. at 70.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 72.
207. Although the judge made a factual finding that James was innocent when the
prosecutor's office moved for its charges to be dismissed, CPS persisted in its efforts to
terminate parental custody. Id. at 74. Alicia's mother attempted suicide. John Wilkens &
Jim Okerblom, Rape-Case Therapist Gives Up License: Accused of Coercing Wade Girl's
Allegation Against Dad, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. Mar. 20, 1996, at B1. The parents
ultimately prevailed in juvenile court. Id. The therapist lost her license and paid one
million dollars toward the settlement of the family's tort action against her and others
involved in the case. Id.
208. CLARKE, supra note 202, at 69-70, 74.
209. Id. at 74.
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reasons to believe that Carder was the culprit, but we may assume
that this evidence was far from conclusive. Imagine that a juror
hearing this nongenetic evidence starts with a prior probability of
1/1001 that Carder is the source of the semen on the nightshirt. The
total prior probability is 1 = 1001/1001, so the remaining probability
mass of 1000/1001 is distributed in some fashion over everyone else in
the population.
What about the likelihoods? The DNA evidence is that one
person, Carder, has been tested, and he matches: E1 = M0. If Carder
is the source then his genotype must match the genotype in the crime-
scene sample. So the likelihood for Carder is just Pr(MIS0) = 1.
Hence, the weighted likelihood for Carder is 1/1001 x 1. The
likelihood for every other hypothesis is the chance that Carder would
match if each untested man-and not Carder-were the source. For
every unrelated man, this probability is the random-match probability
p. Different amounts of the prior probability mass of 1000/1001 may
fall on each of these men, but the sum of the weighted likelihoods has
to be 1000p/1001.
Substituting this value into Bayes' rule (2), we find that the
posterior is
, _X00_I (5)
X00- 1000° I 1+ l00P
Because the random-match probability p in the case was about
one in three million, we conclude that ir0' = 1 / (1 + 1/3000) =
3000/3001 = 0.9997. Thus, the fact that Carder's profile matches
makes most of the prior probability assigned to everyone other than
Carder flow to him, swamping his initially low prior probability.
Unless one can explain the match on some other basis, Carder is
almost certainly the source.
2. The Trawl-as-confirmation Case: n > 1
When the database is larger and only the defendant matches, we
have more information about some of the people who were not tested
in the pure confirmation case. They have been excluded. As people
are excluded, their probability mass flows to the remaining
individuals-including the defendant. The case against the defendant
becomes even stronger. Suppose, for instance, that having identified
Carder by nongenetic evidence, a San Diego County database of
100,000 people, including Carder, is searched. Again, the prior
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probability for Carder is 7r0 = 1/1001. Before the database trawl, the
probability mass outside of Carder (1000/1001) is divided somehow
among the men outside the database. Let's say that 1/6 of the prior
probability of 1000/1001 falls on the convicted offenders in the
database and 5/6 falls on the rest of the population (other than
Carder). The latter group of untested men thus has the prior
probability of (5/6) (1000/1001). Carder still has only a 1/1001 chance
of being the source. The trawl eliminates the 99,999 other men in the
database. Their probability mass flows to the defendant and to the
many untested men. Carder's probability gets a small boost from this,
and he gets a large chunk of the probability mass from the fact that he
does match. Specifically, Bayes' rule reveals that
KOO] 6 (6)
X0+6 ['0 P/ 1] 6 + 50oo0p
Since p = 1/3,000,000, Carder ends up with a total posterior of
18000/18005. This is marginally larger than the probability of
3000/3001 = 18000/18006 in the simple confirmation case. Here, using
the unadjusted random-match probability is an excellent
approximation to the correct value. There is no need to inflate the
random-match probability in the investigate-then-trawl case.
It is not clear that the frequentists dispute this conclusion. The
1996 NRC recommendation was directed only to the "situation ... in
which the suspect is initially identified by searching a database to find
a DNA profile matching that left at a crime scene."21  When the
defendant has been identified by nongenetic evidence, the frequentist
concern with "searching for significance" does not apply. 211 The
defendant has not come to the government's attention by virtue of a
cold hit in a database. He was a hot prospect; therefore, even from
210. NRC II, supra note 16, at 134.
211. The Bayesian statisticians who pioneered this kind of analysis sometimes use the
trawl-as-confirmation case to argue that the frequentist demand for adjusting the random-
match probability is misguided. Balding & Donnelly, supra note 176, at 605, write that the
NRC recommendation, or at least "the rationale behind [it] ... could lead to the rather
absurd situation in which a cunning defense lawyer could insist on one and subsequently
claim that the failure to find additional matches had substantially weakened the case
against their client." See IAN EVETT & BRUCE WEIR, INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE:
STATISTICAL GENETICS FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 222 (1998). However, the 1996
recommendation to multiply p by the database size expressly applies only "[w]hen the
suspect is found by a search of DNA databases." NRC II, supra note 16, at 161. The 1992
NRC report is less clear on this point. It refers to "the selection bias that is inherent in
searching a databank" and broadly condemns "fish[ing] through the databank, trying out
many hypotheses." NRC I, supra note 15, at 124.
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the frequentist perspective, the fact that other profiles were compared
to the one from the crime scene does not reduce the value of the
match to the defendant. It enhances it.
3. The Trawl-then-confirm-successfully Case
All that remains are the cases in which the trawl comes first
rather than last. These resemble data mining in that the government
searches everywhere in the database to find one gold nugget to
exhibit. Assume then that the gold nugget is Carder, who was
unknown to investigators before the database trawl. With Carder's
name at their disposal due to the trawl, investigators uncover the
same clues that would have led them to Carder in the simple
confirmation case, and so he goes on trial.
As suggested earlier, the order in which jurors process new
information makes no difference to the final outcome.212 At the
outset, a juror assigns some initial probability to each competing
hypothesis.213 Suppose that there are two items of evidence, EA and
E, to consider. At trial, each side generally can present its evidence
in the order it chooses. If EA precedes EB, then a first application of
Bayes' rule with likelihoods such as Pr(EAISo) modifies the prior
probability. This posterior probability Pr(SoIEA) becomes the prior
probability in a second application of Bayes' rule with EB as the
evidence. Because multiplication is commutative (the product of any
two numbers x and y is the same as the product of y and x), the
resulting posterior probability is identical to what is obtained by
starting with EB, then considering EA.2 14 It also is the same as
suspending judgment until both EA and EB are presented, then
applying Bayes' rule only once with likelihoods such as Pr[(E &
EB)IS0]. Thus, one can start with the nongenetic evidence or with the
DNA evidence; the final probability, according to Bayes' theorem,
will be the same.
Not only does the formula show that order is irrelevant, but
intuitively it also seems that order should be irrelevant. An
eyewitness might pick a defendant from a set of mug shots at the
outset of an investigation, leading to further evidence against the
individual. This is a trawl-first case (for a database of photographs).
Alternatively, the witness might pick the defendant from mug shots
after the police had already investigated the suspect. This is a trawl-
212. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
213. We will come back to what these might be later. See infra Part III.B.
214. See infra Appendix B.3.
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last case. If the witness has not been influenced by the police
suspicions in the trawl-last case, the match between the witness's
memory and the photograph of the defendant is equally probative in
both cases.215 Consequently, no new calculation is needed to show
that the trawl-then-investigate case can be handled the same way as
the investigate-then-trawl case.216
4. The Trawl-then-confirm-unsuccessfully Case
Finally, suppose that the police were unable to locate substantial
nongenetic evidence against Carder. This is the naked-trawl case.
Now, we can say only that Carder lived in San Diego when the
abduction occurred and that he is a man in the right age range with
matching DNA. The prior probability that Carder is the source
cannot be 1/1001 as it was in the other cases. That figure was
predicated on some nongenetic evidence of guilt that is not present in
the naked trawl situation. Suppose we start with the much smaller
prior of 1/1,000,001, trawl through a database of 100,000, and discover
that only the defendant matches. As before, we stipulate that 5/6 of
the prior probability (which is now 1,000,000/1,000,001) falls on the
men outside the database. The posterior probability will be
)r6 . (7)
Xowoi + y[,00o,0Do O/ ] 6 + 5,000, OOOp
For p = 1/3,000,000, the posterior is only 18/23 = 0.78, indicating that
the total evidence is much less compelling in the naked-trawl case.
But this is not because the trawl is any less probative. The case as
a whole is weaker because there is no incriminating nongenetic
evidence to consider in formulating the prior probability. Suppose
that instead of locating Carder by a DNA trawl, a detective dreamt
that a person named Albert Carder was responsible for an assault,
acquired a sample of Carder's DNA, learned that it matched the
crime-scene sample, and could find no other proof of Carder's
involvement. To apply Bayes' theorem, we simply adjust the prior
probability of 1/1,000,001 according to the version of Bayes' rule that
applies to a simple match case to obtain a posterior of
215. Cf. Donald A. Berry, Comment, 9 STAT. ScI. 252, 254 (1994) (stating that in both
cases the "hypothesis generation and confirmation" should be treated symmetrically).
216. The Appendix gives the formulas that would permit a new calculation should one
be desired.
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F 1,000,0N1 1 . (8)
'o = Xooo,®1 + l'°°o oooo = I + 1, 000, 00p
Since p = 1/3,000,000, the numerical value is 1 / (1 + 1/3) = 3/4 = 0.75.
This quantity is less the 0.78 for the naked-trawl case. Again, the
trawl produces more powerful evidence than a simple match.
The crucial point is that E. always has a bigger impact on the
prior probability than does E. In itself, a trawl that points only to the
defendant is always more convincing evidence of guilt than the same
match in the absence of the more extensive testing provided by the
trawl. Naturally, if the prior probability, which is based on the non-
DNA evidence, is smaller (as it is in a naked trawl case), then the
posterior probability will be smaller. But the existence of a trawl is
not what makes the totality of the evidence less convincing in a naked
trawl case.
These findings refute the frequentist argument about multiple
hypothesis testing. That argument implies that by diminishing the
significance of the match, identifying the defendant by trawling
weakens the total evidence against him. Yet, the DNA evidence is
generally stronger due to the trawl because there is more of it, and all
of it is consistent with the hypothesis S, that the defendant's DNA
was left at the crime scene.
E. Back to Basics
Although the frequentist concern with data mining seems
misplaced, it is worth reexamining the crucial premises of the
Bayesian analysis. First, it assumes that the extent to which evidence
alters the prior odds is what makes it probative. 17 Second, it holds
that the order of the evidence is irrelevant. 18 Finally, the argument
assumes that a prior probability that does not involve the evidence in
question exists and is the same in a trawl-then-investigate case as it is
217. E.g., Kaye & Koehler, supra note 108, at 646-47.
218. E.g., John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV.
1065, 1085 (1968) ("Since Bayes' Theorem is applied again and again by successive
multiplications, . .. the order in which evidence comes in will not affect our rational
decisionmaker though differences of emphasis caused by differing orders of proof may, of
course, have a psychological effect on a real-life jury."); Peter Tillers, Webs of Things in
the Mind: A New Science of Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1225, 1249 (1989) ("a
conventional Bayesian [does not believe] that the order in which evidence is presented is
probatively significant"); supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
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in an investigate-then-trawl case.219 These three premises are so clear
to Bayesians that the preceding argument (usually presented more
elliptically or compactly) seems conclusive to them.
Of course, there are detractors. For instance, Professors Allen
and Pardo seem to deny the first premise, but their main criticism of
likelihoods or Bayesian reasoning boils down to the observation that
probabilities are not self-defining-they must be estimated on the
basis of assumptions and knowledge about the world. 2 0  This is
correct-nature may not be what it seems, ambiguities often prevent
agreement on the values of the probabilities, and one can overlook
plausible alternative hypotheses in formulating the problem. But
these reminders do not refute the claim that evidence is probative to
the extent that it alters our best estimate of the prior probability of a
proposition.
The second premise-that the order of evidence does not alter its
impact on a prior probability (and hence its probative value)-seems
true in theory, but perhaps order affects the assessments of real
jurors. The first thing they hear may color what follows, or the last
may remain more vivid at the time of jury deliberations. If so, the
perceived probative value of the trawl in a trawl-then-investigate case
could differ from the perceived value in an investigate-then-trawl case
even though the conjoined and commuted evidence is identical. But
it is not apparent if there is any consistent order effect in practice or
how it would translate into any prejudice against defendants. In any
event, this psychological theory would not rescue the frequentist
argument that a trawl in the former case is less probative than a
single-comparison DNA match. That too is an argument about the
logical power of evidence without regard to its psychological impact
on jurors.
The third premise is more complicated. It has been argued that
the very idea of a prior probability is incompatible with legal proof
because the probability before hearing any evidence in a case is
undefined22 1 or, according to the Anglo-American presumption of
innocence, must be set to zero.22 Probabilists and philosophers have
struggled for centuries over the assignment of partial beliefs or
219. E.g., Berry, supra note 215, at 253.
220. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical
Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEG. STUD. 107,112 (2007).
221. Lea Brilmayer & Lewis Kornhauser, Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions,
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116, 143-44 (1978).
222. State v. Skipper, 637 A.2d 1101, 1108 (Conn. 1994).
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probabilities in cases of complete ignorance. 223 Bayesians commonly
avoid the issue by asserting that there is always some other evidence
in a case that can serve as the starting point for the prior probability
distribution.224 At a minimum, the jury will have some indication of
the defendant's connection (or lack of it) to the place where the crime
occurred and of the defendant's physical and mental capacity to have
committed the alleged offense. 225 Even starting with prior odds as low
as one to a million, the DNA evidence can produce appreciable
posterior probabilities, as we saw in the naked-trawl example.
Moreover, in the context of criminal trials, a normative basis for
assigning prior probabilities in advance of any evidence is available.226
Arguably, the presumption of innocence means that, ab initio,
everyone in the jurisdiction, the country, or even the world, should be
regarded as having the same prior probability.27 For a suspect
population of size N, this interpretation is tantamount to using a
uniform prior probability of 1/N.
228
Some courts have expressed reservations or antipathy toward the
explicit use of Bayes' rule in the trial process, and proposals to tutor
jurors in how to adjust prior odds have been the subject of an
extended debate among legal commentators. 229 The California Court
223. See, e.g., Max Black, Probability, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 464,
474 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (discussing "the principle of indifference" associated with
Laplace and Bernoulli).
224. Cf id. ("It is hard, of course, to imagine a case in which the reasoner is wholly
ignorant of evidence favoring either P or not-P.").
225. Cf. David H. Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI.
L. REV. 34, 44-45 n.37 (1979) ("[T]here will almost always be some information on which
to base a subjective probability.").
226. There is no legal principle that forces zero to be the prior probability before
evidence is heard. If zero were required, Bayes' rule would imply that no conviction is
possible (since multiplying by zero always gives zero for a posterior probability). But
treating any empirical proposition as having a probability of zero or one amounts to a
dogmatic assertion that no amount of evidence to the contrary can change the probability.
LINDLEY, supra note 190, at 104. This hardly seems appropriate in a system in which
jurors are asked to approach the case with an open mind.
227. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 12.4.3.
228. This assumes that a crime has occurred. The probability of 1/N could be reduced
to reflect the probability that no one is guilty because no crime has been committed. What
the latter probability might be in the absence of all evidence is obscure, but all that
matters for present purposes is that the presumption of innocence plausibly can be
construed as meaning that, initially, the defendant is exchangeable with everyone else in
the population. Under this interpretation of the legal norm, the prior probability
distribution is uniformly low, perhaps even lower than 1/N.
229. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 96, § 210.
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of Appeal in People v. Nelson 230 disparaged the Bayesian solution to
the trawl problem on this ground. The court wrote that:
Use of a Bayesian formula requires a quantified prior
probability and quantifiable new information.... Bayesian
analysis then utilizes a complicated formula to revise the prior
probability on the basis of the new information .... Bayesian
techniques are inherently confusing and would be difficult, if
not impossible, to explain to an average jury .... The end
result of a Bayesian analysis is often misleading.
231
Admittedly, "whether the benefits of using [Bayes' rule] solely to
educate the jury by displaying the probative force of the evidentiary
findings would be worth the costs in terms of time-consumption and
possible confusion is a [close] question, "232 but it is not a question that
arises in using Bayes' rule to decide whether trawling degrades the
probative value of a DNA match. The argument is not that the jury
must use Bayes' rule to give a trawl its proper weight. Instead it is
that the jury, whether or not it is told that the defendant was
identified through a trawl, can use the random-match probability just
as it would in a confirmation case.
This leaves but one possible flaw in the argument about the
probative value of a trawl. The third premise implicit in our use of
Bayes' rule is the postulate of equal priors as between trawl and
confirmation cases. This works for an idealized juror who reasons as
Bayes' rule prescribes. But would real jurors be prone to overvalue
the DNA match by, in effect, using too high a prior probability in a
trawl-then-investigate case? The FBI's DNA Advisory Board
apparently thought so, at least in the context of a naked-trawl case.233
But this impression of how jurors reason is debatable. Without a
rather subtle empirical study of real jurors, it is difficult to say how
230. 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399 (Ct. App. 3 Dist. 2006), affd, 185 P.3d 49 (Cal. 2008).
231. Id. at 416. Strangely, the court cited my revision of MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 211 at 335 (John Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999), which only condemned a dubious application
of Bayes' theorem in parentage testing cases. With regard to correct applications of the
theorem in that context, I wrote that "[t]here is ... a strong argument for using a Bayesian
approach to help the jury evaluate the evidence." Id.
232. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 96, § 210 at 332.
233. The Board wrote that:
[W]ithout the Bayesian framework, the Balding and Donnelly (1996) formulation
is easily misinterpreted in a fashion unfavorable to the suspect. Stockmarr's
(1999) formulation, which is a more formal exposition of what originally appeared
in the NRC II Report (1996), communicates a value of a database search far
better, and it is always conservative.
DNA Advisory Board, supra note 22.
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jurors handle naked DNA evidence cases. In any event, as I argue
below, the defense should be permitted to argue that the prior
probability is so small that the DNA match does not establish guilt.234
In these circumstances, the normal rules of evidence should allow
jurors to learn of a match and the random-match probability instead
of substituting (or adding) an inflated match probability.
Thus, all the premises of the Bayesian analysis of trawling
emerge intact. The fact that the defendant is identified by a trawl
strengthens rather than weakens the hypothesis of guilt. The
random-match probability therefore retains its value as an indication
of probative value, and courts like Jenkins, Johnson, and Nelson are
justified in admitting random-match probabilities even in trawl cases.
But this is only the prosecution side of the equation. The final Part of
this Article turns to the defense side. It discusses how the defense can
place the random-match probability in proper perspective.
III. BAYES IS BETTER?
Some statisticians have proposed that juries should be advised to
start with a uniform prior distribution and adjust this prior iteratively
for each new item of evidence.235 This is quite different than the
preceding analysis which used Bayes' rule solely as a heuristic device
to analyze whether a trawl is less probative than an isolated match
and did not demand that an idealized juror update a personal
probability for every new piece of evidence."6 Nevertheless, as trawls
continue to generate suspects and prosecutions, defendants may be
tempted to pursue this approach. Several courts have suggested that
this defense tactic should not be permitted. As we just saw, Nelson
contains such dicta, and as we soon shall see, the English Court of
Appeal has been hostile to the courtroom use of Bayes' rule. Despite
these judicial misgivings, Section A argues that defendants should be
allowed to advance an explicitly Bayesian treatment if they choose. It
also describes how the prosecution can respond. Section B argues
against the less coherent approach of presenting both the adjusted
and the unadjusted probability, as suggested in Jenkins and Nelson. It
contends that multiplying by the database size n produces too large
234. See infra Part III.A.
235. E.g., Berry, supra note 215, at 254 (proposing one possible initial distribution).
236. Of course, one can modify the details of this proposal to allow the jurors to think
about all the nongenetic evidence as a whole, then apply Bayes' rule. Indeed, that is the
manner in which Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 34, first provocatively proposed
incorporating Bayes' rule into the trial process.
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an adjustment and sketches a frequentist alternative that is more
appropriate.
A. Bayes for the Defense
Although I have deployed Bayes' rule to demonstrate that a
trawl match is at least as probative as a confirmation match, thereby
supporting the prosecution's use of the random-match probability in
trawl cases, the rule could be employed by a defendant to show that
the trawl does not give the jury sufficient evidence to convict.
Defense counsel pursued the strategy of using Bayes' theorem with a
uniform prior probability distribution in two unusual trials stemming
from a rape north of London. In its first opinion in R. v. Adams,2 37
the Court of Appeal related that "a Miss Marley ... was walking
home after an evening out on April 6, 1991. Her attacker was a
stranger. He approached and asked her the time. She saw his face
for a matter of seconds before looking at her watch. He raped her
from behind." '238 She described her assailant to the police as "a white,
clean shaven, man with a local accent aged 20 to 25.,,239 Time passed.
"In October 1993 she attended an identification parade but did not
pick out [Adams] or anyone else. ' 240 In fact, she later said that
Adams did not look like the man who had attacked her.
241
The prosecution's case rested entirely on a match between a
DNA sample from Denis Adams and semen from a vaginal swab
taken soon after the attack. The Crown's expert testified that "the
chance of a randomly chosen unrelated man matching the DNA
profile was one in 297 m. rounded down in the interests of
'conservatism' to 200,000,000. ''242 Adams maintained that the match
was coincidental. He had a brother, and an expert testified that the
chance of "a full brother having the same nine DNA bands is one in
220.''243 He testified that he could not have been the rapist because he
had spent the night with his girlfriend, who corroborated his
testimony.244  Peter Donnelly, Professor of Statistical Science at
Oxford University, testified for the defense. He expressed concerns
about sampling error in estimates of allele frequencies and other
237. [1996] 2 Crim. App. 467 (CA (Crim. Div)).
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matters, and suggested that "the right answer might be in the range of
2 m. rather than 200,000,000 .... "245
In addition, Donnelly described to the jurors how they might
apply Bayes' rule.246  Rather than begin with a prior probability
reflecting all the nongenetic evidence-the circumstances of the
crime, the fact that Adams did not match the victim's description of
the assailant, and his alibi-Donnelly started with a prior probability
based on the general circumstances alone. He noted that in "Hemel
Hempstead there are just over 150,000 ... men between the age of 18
and 60. 1247 Assuming as "an illustration," that it was 75% probable
that the rapist came from this region, Donnelly arrived at 200,000 for
the suspect-population size. In this manner, he arrived at the prior
"odds on a particular local man ... being the true rapist [of] 200,000
to one .... 248
Starting from this uniform prior, Donnelly used examples of
likelihood ratios for each item of evidence-the victim's inability to
identify Adams, Adam's testimony, the girlfriend's testimony, and the
DNA match-in successive iterations of Bayes' rule to conclude that
the final posterior odds would be 55:1 on guilt if the random-match
probability were 1/200,000,000, but only 5.5:1 if that probability were
1/20,000,000, and only 0.55:1 ("he is almost twice as likely to be
innocent than guilty") if the match probability were 1/2,000,000.249 As
Professor Donnelly wrote years later, "unlike in many DNA cases, it
really did matter whether the number was 1 in 2 or 20 or 200
million. 251
Despite this presentation, the jury convicted Adams. Adams
appealed. He argued, first, that "the DNA evidence upon which the
Crown had relied was incapable on its own of establishing guilt. '251
The Court of Appeal (like its counterparts in America) 2 2 saw nothing
245. Id. at 470.
246. Professor Donnelly distanced himself from this presentation, writing that "I
should be clear that it was neither my suggestion nor my choice to explain Bayes's [sic]
Theorem to the jury in the Adams case, and I remain unconvinced that it is a practicable
way forward. In Adams, it was the defence barrister's choice, presumably because he felt
it would increase the possibility of a favourable verdict for his client." Peter Donnelly,
Appealing Statistics, 2 SIGNIFICANCE 46, 48 (2005).
247. Adams, 2 Crim. App. at 472.
248. Id. at 473-74.
249. Id. at 477.
250. Donnelly, supra note 246, at 47.
251. R. v. Adams [1998] 2 Crim. App. 377, 378 (CA (Crim Div)).
252. See Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (observing that
"the perils of eyewitness identification testimony far exceed those presented by DNA
expert testimony" and affirming that a verdict can be based on DNA alone (quoting
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inherently unjust or improper in basing a conviction on a naked DNA
match.25 3 But Adams argued, second, that the trial judge, in summing
up the evidence for the jury, failed to recapitulate Donnelly's
testimony clearly and accurately and neglected to instruct the jury in
how to combine the genetic and nongenetic evidence if it did not wish
to apply Bayes' theorem. 254 Now the Court of Appeal agreed.255 It
quashed that conviction and ordered a retrial. Furthermore, although
there had been no objection to the reliance on Bayes' rule at the trial
and no argument on appeal that the testimony was inadmissible, the
Court of Appeal sua sponte opined that "to introduce Bayes
Theorem, or any similar method, into a criminal trial plunges the jury
into inappropriate and unnecessary realms of theory and complexity
deflecting them from their proper task.,
256
So Adams faced a second trial. The defense was unwilling to
drop the Bayesian analysis. The prosecution's statisticians from the
Forensic Science Service agreed that "in principle Bayes's [sic]
Theorem was the logically correct way to combine ... evidence. "257
Despite the ominous dicta from the appellate court, the trial judge
agreed to allow a Bayesian presentation. Indeed, he "asked the
experts on both sides to get together and prepare a questionnaire
which would help the jury to implement Bayes's [sic] Theorem,
should they choose to do so. ' '258 In due course,
[t]he questionnaires were produced, and there were boxes
where [the jurors] could enter their numerical assessments, with
a formula explaining how to combine them. The jury were told
that this was in the experts' view the right way to do the
People v. Rush, 630 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), affd, 672 N.Y.S.2d 362 (App.
Div. 1998)); People v. Rush, 672 N.Y.S.2d 362, 363 (App. Div. 1998) (upholding conviction
based only on DNA evidence, even given that complainant misidentified defendant at
trial, and rejecting argument that DNA is not "infallible" and thus cannot stand alone
because "[v]irtually no evidence is absolutely conclusive").
253. But see Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and
the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 741 n.87 (2007)
(referring to an unreported English Court of Appeal case quashing a conviction where the
random match probability of profile was about one in four million and the accused,
according to Mike Redmayne, Appeals to Reason, 65 MOD. L. REV. 19 (2002), had no
connection to the area).
254. R. v. Adams [1998] 2 Crim. App. 377,378 (CA (Crim Div)).
255. Id. at 385.
256. Id. at 384 (quoting Adams, 2 Crim. App. at 482).
257. Donnelly, supra note 246, at 47.
258. Id.
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reasoning, but that they were the jury and it was entirely up tothem .... 259
Furthermore, the court supplied basic electronic calculators to
the jurors, and Donnelly "walked the jury through a numerical
example-the barrister would suggest token numbers in answer to the
questions, and the jury and I entered them in the calculators....
They seemed to have no difficulty in following this .... 260 The judge
instructed the jury to take the questionnaires to the jury room as well
as a blank one in case they wished to enter a prior probability and
likelihoods "to fill in your collective view if you want to."26 ' But he
did not encourage them to deliberate in this fashion. To the contrary,
he informed them that:
There is absolutely no compulsion on you to use it at all.... It
was suggested by [defendant's counsel] that you might think it
only fair to this defendant for at least one of you to do it. I
hope he will forgive me if I discourage that and for this reason:
Your duty, when it comes first thing tomorrow morning, is to
retire, consider your verdict amongst yourselves, all of you
together and not with one huddled in a corner with his
calculator.262
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Adams appealed. His
argument that the trial judge was too disparaging of the
questionnaires failed dismally. Again, and in the same words as
before, the Court of Appeal condemned the elaborate exercise in
Bayesian reasoning as confusing and distracting, plunging "the jury
into inappropriate and unnecessary realms of theory and complexity
deflecting them from their proper task. 263
259. Id. at 48.
260. Id.
261. Adams, 2 Crim. App. at 382.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 384. Arguably, the court left room for a Bayesian presentation in
extraordinary circumstances. It wrote that:
We do not consider that [jurors] will be assisted in their task by reference to a very
complex approach which they are unlikely to understand fully and even more
unlikely to apply accurately, which we judge to be likely to confuse them and
distract them from their consideration of the real questions on which they should
seek to reach a unanimous conclusion. We are very clearly of opinion that in cases
such as this, lacking special features absent here, expert evidence should not be
admitted to induce juries to attach mathematical values to probabilities arising
from non-scientific evidence adduced at the trial.
[Vol. 87
ANALYSIS OF DNA TRAWLING CASES
The court's disapproval of a Bayesian presentation by the
defense is too sweeping. The jury's task is to give the DNA evidence
the weight it logically deserves. Although the Adams case, with its
calculators and sequential processing of all the evidence,
understandably struck the Court of Appeal as problematic, "realms of
theory and complexity" need not accompany an illustration of how a
likelihood ratio alters a prior probability.2" In a naked-trawl case, for
example, it would not be unreasonable for the defendant to argue
that the jury should begin by treating everyone in the general
population as equally likely to have left the DNA.265 In our naked-
trawl modification of the Carder case, the jury could be informed of
the following: that if one starts by assuming that the defendant is no
more likely than any other man in San Diego County to be the source
of the semen stain, then the prior probability is about one in
1,400,000; that if the source is unrelated to the defendant, the match
to the semen stain is very unlikely (1/3,000,000); and that the match
raises the probability to only about 68% (or even less if relatives are
considered).
The prosecution might not like this calculation. It might regard
as ridiculous the assumption that there were 700,000 men to consider
as possible murderers. Indeed, even if this starting point does capture
the normative sense of the presumption of innocence, the defense
might be foolish to use it. The number applies when the jury knows
only that a man sexually assaulted someone in San Diego. As soon as
the prosecution proves that a man with certain physical features took
Alicia from her bedroom and sexually assaulted her, the jury knows
much more. It will have some idea of the man's age, race, and
physical abilities. This will exclude many of the 1.4 million men living
in San Diego country from the initial pool of men who are
exchangeable with Carder. If we limit the pool to the most common
race in San Diego County, whites, and to men between the ages of 18
and 65, the population size drops to approximately 450,000, and the
probability rises to 87%. Even if Alicia's description of the age were
this vague, this population seems too large since some men would
have been in the hospital or have been too feeble to have carried her
away; many would have airtight alibis; many would be psychologically
incapable of the alleged conduct.
Id. at 385. Adams was not identified by trawling the British database, but whether a naked
trawl would constitute a "special feature" that would justify instructions in mathematics is
obscure. Id.
264. Id. at 384.
265. See supra Part II.D.1.
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Alternatively, rather than argue that the defendant's selection of
a prior probability is unrealistic, the prosecution also could regard
many of these men as part of the suspect population but point to
admissible facts about Carder that distinguish him from the mass of
male humanity. Did he live or work near Alicia's home? Was he in
good health with the physical capacity to enter through the window
and carry the little girl off? These considerations and others like
them will shift additional probability mass to Carder. If Carder spoke
to the police or if he takes the witness stand, there would be other
reasons to challenge the defense's number. Did he have an airtight
alibi, for example, as many of the 1,400,000 men surely did? But if, at
the end of the day, the prosecution cannot distinguish Carder from
the remainder of the male population that was capable of performing
the alleged acts in this naked-trawl case, then he should be
acquitted.266 In sum, the defendant's effort to say what the match
proves might be flawed, but it is within the realm of reason and can
stimulate the jury to think more critically about the meaning and
limitations of the naked-trawl evidence. It does not seem so complex
and esoteric as to be antithetical to the trial process.
B. Other np-like Rules
Using Bayes' rule for the defense by starting with a small enough
prior probability in a cold hit case is only one tactic that a defendant
could use to try to overcome the prosecution's random-match
probability. In People v. Puckett, for example, the defendant tried to
introduce evidence that the random-match probability pertained to a
266. Moreover, in some circumstances, a gap in the prosecution's case is itself evidence
in favor of the defendant's innocence. If one would expect to have the missing evidence
when the defendant is guilty and not when he is innocent, it tends to prove innocence. For
a Bayesian analysis, see D.H. Kaye, Do We Need a Calculus of Weight to Understand
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, 66 B. U. L. REV. 657 (1986), reprinted in
PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES AND LIMITS OF
BAYESIANISM 129 (Peter Tillers & Eric Green eds., 1988). For example, if a bank has
been robbed and a suspect has been apprehended before he could have hidden or
disposed of the currency, the failure of a diligent search to locate the currency in his
possession should give us pause. Thus, naked-trawl evidence is weaker when there ought
to be more to the case than a DNA match.
In some naked-trawl cases, of course, the prosecution can explain away the gap in
its case. Skillful advocates appreciate the need to explain the absence of expected
evidence, and the law of evidence should allow for such proof in cases of negative
evidence. The case against John Davis mentioned at the start of this Article, for example,
was cold as well as naked. Barbara Martz had been murdered over 20 years ago. The
absence of a witness or circumstantial evidence besides the DNA that would associate
Davis with the death of his neighbor might be expected even on the hypothesis of guilt.
See Van Derbeken, supra note 6.
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database trawl and that the adjusted probability np was not 1 in 1.1
million, but one in three. 67 The trial court refused to allow this"6
although it is not clear why. Certainly, when the defendant wants to
prove that he was identified by a trawl, the argument that revealing
the defendant's criminal status would be prejudicial to the defendant
makes little sense. Here, I suggest that the 1/3 figure is, strictly
speaking, irrelevant, and that if a court were to give the defense the
latitude to call experts to testify to adjusted p-obabilities,269 the np
adjustment would need to be modified.
If pure logic were the only consideration, no np-like statistic
would be permitted. The figure of np = 1/3 in People v. Puckett, for
instance, is an estimate of the probability that a database of n =
338,000 would yield a hit to someone (not necessarily Puckett) if it
were composed exclusively of individuals who are not the source of
the crime-scene DNA (and who are not identical twins of the true
source). Unlike the random-match probability of p = 1/1,100,000,
however, this number is not a likelihood that is of interest to the
jury.27° As the California Supreme Court acknowledged in Nelson,
the legal issue is not whether the database is innocent, but only
whether the named defendant is guilty or innocent. 71 From the
Bayesian perspective, it is hard to see how the 1/3 figure is of much
benefit to a juror in assessing the hypothesis that Puckett's DNA (as
opposed to some unrelated person's DNA) was recovered from the
victim.
Nevertheless, defendants can be expected to argue that the
innocent-database-match probability is not completely irrelevant.
After all, if the database is innocent, then so is the individual who
became a suspect because his profile was in it. Although each side in
the statistical debate over adjustment claims that only its favorite
probability should be admissible, perhaps the introduction of the
innocent-database probability on top of the random-match
probability can be rationalized as a Solomonic compromise, giving
each side half of what it wants and trusting that their further
267. Chris Smith, DNA's Identity Crisis, S. F. MAG., Sept. 2008, http://www.sanfran
mag.com/story/dna's-identity-crisis.
268. Id.
269. Expert testimony to this effect is (or has been) available to the defense. See, e.g.,
id. (describing the opinions of Professor William Thompson).
270. A "likelihood," it will be recalled from Part II, measures how much a datum
supports a hypothesis. Technically, it is proportional to the conditional probability of the
evidence given the hypothesis. See, e.g., RICHARD ROYALL, STATISTICAL INFERENCE: A
LIKELIHOOD PARADIGM 24-28 (1997).
271. People v. Nelson, 185 P.3d 49, 66 (Cal. 2008).
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statements will clarify the matter for the jury. This let-it-all-in ruling
would allow individuals who were charged as a result of a database
trawl to introduce testimony about the chance that an innocent
database would have within it a profile that matches the crime-scene
DNA. Although introducing both the adjusted and the unadjusted
number seems more confusing than edifying, it might well appeal to
judges who understandably find it hard to decide whether the
frequentist perspective is appropriate here.
If defendants are permitted to introduce an adjusted
probability-an outcome that certainly is consistent with the
(incomplete) analysis in Jenkins and Nelson-then this adjustment
should not be made with the nominal size n of the database. Instead,
a smaller, "effective database size," n', should be used.272 The
frequentist perspective suggests that the jury needs to know how
often innocent defendants would be charged if the null hypothesis
(that the crime-scene DNA came from someone outside the
database) were always true. If individuals who clearly could not have
committed the crime will not be charged then there is no risk that
they will be falsely convicted. Therefore, to the extent that non-
viable suspects are included in the database, np does not provide the
risk of a false decision even when the null hypothesis is true. Instead
of multiplying by n, we should be multiplying by the number n', which
represents the number of potentially realistic suspects within the
database.
With convicted-offender databases, n' can be substantially
smaller than n because these databases include samples from
offenders who are behind bars and could not realistically be the
perpetrators of new crimes in the outside world. They may even
include individuals who are dead but whose records have not been
purged. When evidence from a decades-old crime is tested, young
offenders who could not possibly have committed the crime will be in
the database. In People v. Puckett, for example, many of the 338,000
individuals in the 2004 database were not even alive when Diana
Sylvester was killed over thirty years ago. Had the matching software
been designed to skip over their profiles, the outcome would have
been no more (or less) probative, but the np rule would have
produced a smaller adjusted probability. Nothing useful is
accomplished by complicating the database searches so that they
272. I am grateful to John Hartmann for raising this point. E-mail from John
Hartmann, Senior Forensic Scientist, Orange County, Cal. Sheriff-Coroner Dep't., to D.H.
Kaye, Regents' Professor, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law (May 23, 2008, 14:41
MST) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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exclude impossible suspects before the trawl or look first at the most
plausible suspects. 3  If the defendant is allowed to introduce an
adjusted random-match probability, an n'p statistic is more
appropriate than the np figure.274
Although the relevance of even the n'p figure is doubtful, it is
loosely related to yet another approach that places the random-match
probability p in perspective. A defendant might try to argue that
even though the DNA profile in question is not likely to be shared by
many other unrelated people, it could be present in at least a few
other individuals in a large population of potential suspects. Instead
of asking how many other people in the database could be considered
viable suspects, we could ask how many people would fall into this
category of matching, unrelated individuals in the vicinity. Perhaps
the entire male population of the San Francisco Bay area between
certain ages approximates the size of the initial population of
potential suspects. If we call this number n*, then n*p is an estimate
of the number of unrelated individuals within this population who
share the DNA profile taken from the victim's body. Census data
suggest that there were over two million men between the ages of
eighteen and sixty-four years in the Bay area in 2000.75 Since p is
about one in 1.1 million, n*p is approximately two, indicating that
Puckett is not the only man in the region who would have the
273. Anticipating that some defendant will introduce the np figure to moderate the
prosecution's p, the state might be tempted to adopt a more complicated search strategy.
It could arrange the database in order of decreasing suspicion. The least suspicious people
in the database would be those who were incarcerated, not yet born, or very young at the
time that the crime was committed. They would be at the bottom of the list. Those living
in the locale of the crime and being of the same sex, age, or race of the perpetrator (when
such information is available) would be at the top of the list. Instead of searching the
entire list, the state could confine (at least initially) the trawl to the most likely candidates.
Rather than trawl all 338,000 profiles in Puckett, for instance, California might have
trawled only (let us say) 11,000 profiles and stopped if it obtained a match in that group of
prime suspects. In this situation, np would have been 11/1100 = 1/100. Or, it could have
gone down the whole, ordered list until it obtained a cold hit, then stopped. If the hit
occurred at profile number 110, for instance, it might seem that the adjusted p would be
110/1,100,000 = 1/1000. However, this method of adjusting p would not be the correct if
the stopping rule would have allowed more profiles to be compared had the cold hit not
occurred at that point. See DAVID 0. SIEGMUND, SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS: TESTS AND
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS 37-39 (1985); Thomas D. Cook, P-Value Adjustment in
Sequential Clinical Trials, 58 BIOMETRICS 1005, 1005 (2002) (discussing the effect of
stopping rules in clinical trials in medicine).
274. Cf. Storvik & Egeland, supra note 22, at 923-24 (describing but not endorsing a
substitute for the np rule that incorporates the size of a realistic population of potential
suspects).
275. METRO. TRANSP. COMM'N AND ASS'N OF BAY AREA GovT'S, BAY AREA
CENSUS (2003), available at http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/bayarea.htm.
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requisite DNA profile. This reasoning is a much simplified version of
the Bayesian presentation, outlined in the previous Section. In
essence, it postulates a uniform prior probability distribution over
most of the male population in the geographic region. As noted
there, it remains open to the prosecution to argue that the defendant
is much more likely than the other possible members of this suspect
population-as whittled down by the DNA evidence-to be the
source. But if the prosecution has no evidence or reasonable
arguments that can distinguish the defendant from the genetic
cohorts, then the jury lacks a posterior probability large enough to
warrant a conviction.
CONCLUSION
The statistical literature on database trawls reflects two different
perspectives on proof. The frequentist perspective that has motivated
recommendations to devalue a match in a database is appropriate
when asking how often trawls of an "innocent database" can be
expected to incriminate a person who is genetically unrelated to a
crime-scene stain. But this is a poor measure of the probative value
of a database search in comparison to a confirmation search. The
database match is at least as probative as the more limited
information that comes from an isolated match. Consequently, the
fear of data mining is not a reason to present an inflated random-
match probability.
The trawl evidence, standing alone, may seem weaker because a
naked-trawl case has less evidence in toto than a confirmation match.
But regardless of whether a trawl comes before, after, or without
substantial nongenetic evidence, a complete trawl of a large database
produces a large change in the prior odds. As such, it provides
probative evidence. Because the change in the probability is slightly
greater than that for a nontrawl DNA match to the same individual,
the case can be presented, if need be, without mentioning the trawl
and without adjusting the random-match probability.
Courts have been reluctant to pursue the reasoning that divides
frequentists and Bayesians. They have recognized that the question
that is posed determines the statistical answer, but they have not
penetrated to the core issue of which question-and hence, which
statistic-is relevant. The argument developed here supports the
admission of the random-match probability in database-trawl cases.
As the Jenkins and Nelson courts recognized, the issue is indeed one
of relevance and legal policy, not genetics and DNA science.
However, the statistical literature on multiple-hypothesis testing and
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database searches is pertinent to this legal question. Only by sorting
out the logical arguments for and against adjustment of the random-
match statistic can the trawl issue be put to rest.276
276. In pursuing these arguments, I have concluded that whatever numerical value the
random-match probability for a given profile might have, an objection to the random-
match probability on the ground that trawling degrades the probative value of the match is
not well taken. Of course, the analysis does not address other possible objections to
random-match probabilities. For example, I have taken estimates of random-match
probabilities in the trillionths, quadrillionths, quintillionths, sextillionths, and septillionths
at face value. Such exquisitely small numbers result primarily from the population-
genetics models that justify the repeated multiplication of allele frequencies. The models
have been subjected to considerable study and found to be reasonable, but whether they
can be pushed to these limits is open to debate. This question, and others like it, must be
left for another day.
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APPENDIX
This appendix provides a more precise and compact
mathematical analysis of the effect of a database trawl. 77 It uses the
notation of Part II, which is summarized in Table A.1:
Table A.1. Notation for
Hypotheses and Data in a Database Trawl Case
Individuals in the Population
to I I I .. I 1.,
f Defendant I The rest of the population of size N ]
Individuals in the Database
[ Io I 1,  ... I 1X4
Defendant I The rest of the database of size n
Hypotheses About the Source
S, I S1  I S1 I ... I S. ]
Likelihoods for Hypotheses About Everyone
j L I L, I L2 .. 1 L. 1
! Pr(EIS) I Pr(EIS,) I Pr(lilSo) I ... I Pr(EISo)
Prior Probabilities
I I W2  I ... I a ]
l Pr(S0) I Pr(S,) I Pr(s,) I ... I Pr(S1 ,) I
Posterior Probabilities
I M2o I r'  t, I ... I ZM4 ]
f Pr(SoIE) I Pr(SIE) I Pr(S!E) I ... I Pr(SoIE) ]
Events (Facts or Data) and Evidence (E)
M, An individual I1 has the same genotype as the crime-scene sample (a match)
X, An individual Ij has a different genotype as the crime-scene sample (an exclusion)
E. The event that defendant matches and all the other individuals in a database of
size n are excluded (MI & X, & .. & X.4)
277. The exposition in Part II elaborates on Walsh & Buckleton, supra note 22, at 464-
69.
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A. Derivation of Bayes' Rule
The world can be in one of N possible, mutually exclusive states
Sj (= 0, 1, ... , N-1). We make an observation E that has a well-
defined probability Pr(EISj) of arising under each state. For example,
a card drawn at random from a well shuffled deck of playing cards
might be an ace of diamonds. This is one of the fifty-two most finely
grained, possible states. The observation E might be that the card is
an ace. But we have no data on which ace it is.
Let Pr(Sj) be the probability of the state prior to making the
observation. Let Pr(SjlE) be the conditional probability of the state
given the observation E. The definition of conditional probability
states that
Pr(Sj1E) = Pr(Sj & E) / Pr(E). (A.1)
The joint probability Pr(Sj & E) = Pr(E & Sj). Hence,
Pr(SlE) = Pr(E & Sj) / Pr(E). (A.2)
From the definition of conditional probability, we also know that
Pr(EISj) = Pr(E & Sj) / Pr(Sj).
Rearranging terms,
Pr(E & S,) = Pr(S) Pr(EIS,). (A.3)
Substituting (A.3) into (A.2) gives
Pr(SjIE) = Pr(Si) Pr(EISj) / Pr(E). (A.4)
But E = (E & So) or (E & Si) or ... or (E & SN-1). Since each
conjunction is mutually exclusive,
Pr(E) = Pr(E & So) + (E & S,) + ... + Pr(E & SN-I).
Now since Pr(E & S) = Pr(Sj) Pr(EISj), we have
Pr(E) = Pr(So) Pr(EISo) + Pr(S,) Pr(EIS,) +... + Pr(SN_,) Pr(EIS_). (A.5)
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The conditional probability of the observation E given the state of
nature S can be called a "likelihood" LE(S), or Lj. The prior
probabilities Pr(Sj) can be abbreviated as 7rj. Then
Pr(E) = I r j (A.6)
Substituting (A.6) into (A.4) and writing Pr(So) Pr(EISo) as 7roLo, we
conclude that
Pr(S. I E) = N- (A.7)
Restating (A.7) in words gives Equation (2) of Part II.
The other formulas for Bayes' rule in Part II come from
expanding the denominator, Pr(E) in (A.6) as follows:
N-1 N-1 n-I N-I
Pr(E)= Zo 'rLj= + 7rjL =zL + 1' j +j,' tLj. (A.8)
B. The Impact of Trawl Evidence
Part II described four situations:
" A pure confirmation case: nongenetic information points to
the defendant; he is the only one tested, and he matches.
* An investigate-then-trawl case: the nongenetic information
is followed by a confirming database trawl that points only to
the defendant (everyone else in the database is excluded).
* A trawl-then-investigate-successfully case: the trawl points
only to the defendant and is followed by an investigation that
uncovers the same confirming nongenetic information-one
type of cold-hit case.
* A trawl-then-investigate-unsuccessfully case: the trawl
points only to the defendant and is followed by an
investigation that uncovers no confirming nongenetic
information-another type of cold-hit case.
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Part II stated that the second and third cases produce the
strongest body of evidence. The first case ranks next, and the last
case, which has the least total evidence, comes in last. In every case,
however, the trawl is equally significant. The remainder of this
Appendix proves these assertions and shows how to obtain the
numbers for the examples in Part II.
1. The Pure Confirmation Case: n = 1
Bayes' rule is easily applied to the simple confirmation case.
According to (A.7) and (A.8),
7o = Pr(So I E,) -l-1 (B.1)
K0L0 + E,'T
The DNA evidence is that one person, Io, has been tested, and he
matches: E, = Mo. If Io is the source (So), then his genotype must
match the genotype in the crime-scene sample:
Lo = Pr(MSo) = 1. (B.2)
The likelihood for every other hypothesis Sj (j > 0) is the chance that
Io would match if the untested man I (j > 0) were the source. For
every unrelated man, this probability is the random-match probability
p. The prior probability for each Sj could be different, but
Z, IT =1 'Ti =tP pj'19 = P(1 ifo). (B.3)
Substituting (B.2) and (B.3) into (B.1) yields
T = Pr(s. IE1 ) = +o (B.4)
Example 1. Let ro = 1/1001. Substituting this value into (B.4)
and simplifying the fraction yields 7r0' = 1 / (1 + 1000p). Let the
random-match probability p = 1/3,000,000. Then
7r0' = 1 / (1 + 1/3000) = 3000/3001 = 0.9997,
as stated in Part II.
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2. The Trawl-as-confirmation Case: n > 1
Since only the defendant matches, the DNA evidence is no
longer E = M0. Now it is E. = M0 & X, & ... & X, (Io matches;
everyone else in the database is excluded). This changes the
likelihoods in (B.1). Initially, consider a database consisting of only
two individuals, I0, and an unrelated individual I. The full evidence is
E, = M0 & X. The likelihood for the defendant, I, is
Lo = Pr(EISo) = Pr[(Mo & X)1S0)]. (B.5)
This quantity can be expressed in terms of the random-match
probability. If I, is the source, he is certain to possess the matching
genotype, but I, is not certain to be excluded. 1L could match by
coincidence. The chance of that happening is the random-match
probability p. So the chance that I, is excluded when Io is the source is
1 - p. This is our likelihood:
Lo = 1 -p. (B.6)
We also need the likelihoods L, through LN,. L, is easy. If L were
the source, he could not have been excluded. Hence, his likelihood is
L,=O. (B.7)
Moving outside the database to any untested person, Ij (j > n), we
know that the only way that Io can match if I is the source is by
coincidence, an event that has probability p. And, the chance of
excluding L is 1 - p. Notice also that whether L matches is unrelated
to whether Io does (when the source is some untested person Ij). The
final result is that the likelihood for I. isI
Li = Pr[(Mo & X,)ISj] = Pr(MoIS) Pr(XIS) = p(l - p), where 0 < j < N.
(B.8)
Substituting (B.6), (B.7), and (B.8) into (B.1),
KO (B.9)g'o = Pr( I E2) = (B.9)go+ P12-'
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The only difference between (B.9) and (B.4) is that in the two-person
trawl case, the coefficient of p in the denominator has one less prior
in the sum. This reflects the fact that the other member of the
database was excluded. A smaller denominator means a larger
fraction. The effect of the larger database trawl has been to provide
additional information that increases the posterior probability.
The result is easily generalized. If there are n individuals in the
database and the trawl excludes all of them except for the defendant
I0, then the expression for the posterior probability becomes
rt = Pr(S0 I E.) N-1 (B.10)
To compare (B.10) to (B.4) more transparently, we can use the
relationship
1- I N-1 n-1 + -N-1
r= Z Iz 1Yj + ,, rj". (B.11)
This equation states that the prior probability not assigned to the
defendant (1 - z0) is divided into two parts. The second part, which
applies to the untested group, is some fraction 0 of 1 - it0:
yN-1 Tj = 6( -. (B.12)
The remainder, (1 - 0) (1 - 7ro), is the prior probability assigned to the
database as a group.
Substituting (B.12) into (B.10), we conclude that
f-o (B.13)
, + Op (1 
-
The only difference from (B.4) is the presence of the fraction 0 in the
denominator. That 0 < 1 reflects the fact that as the database expands
and more individuals are excluded as possible sources, more terms
disappear from the summation in the denominator, increasing the
value of the posterior probability. Trawling itself yields stronger, not
weaker evidence.
Example 2. Having identified A) by nongenetic evidence, a
database of 100,000 people, including I0, is searched. Again, let the
prior probability for the hypothesis So be ir0 = 1/1001. Let the fraction
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of the remaining prior probability of 1 - 7ro = 1000/1001 that falls on
the men outside the database be 0 = 5/6. Then, by (B.13), the
posterior will be Pr(S0E,o o) = 18000/18005. This is slightly larger
than Pr(SE,) = 3000/3001 = 18000/18006 obtained with (B.4). The
confirmation-trawl evidence is marginally stronger than the simple
confirmation-match evidence.
3. The Trawl-then-confirm-successfully Case
Assume that after the trawl points to I0, investigators uncover the
same clues that would have led them to h in the simple confirmation
case, and he is on trial. The order in which jurors process new
information according to Bayes' rule (which reduces to (B.13)),
makes no difference. Consequently, equation (B.13) applies to the
trawl-then-investigate case, just as it does to the investigate-then-
trawl case. Again, a successful trawl match is more probative than a
successful single-suspect confirmation match.278
To prove explicitly that the same bundle of evidence has the
same probative value regardless of whether the trawl comes first or
last, we start with a prior probability distribution pj = Pr(S). This
distribution applies before considering both the findings F of a
conventional investigation and the result T of the trawl. In the
investigate-first case, the nongenetic evidence F modifies the prior
probability p, that any individual I is the source according to Bayes
rule (A.7) with likelihoods f = Pr(/1S):
p=Pr(Sj IF) - Pi (B.14)Pi -1Ip
Now we trawl and learn that only the defendant matches. To update
these probabilities pj' we apply Bayes' rule a second time with the
likelihoods L = Pr(1S) for this DNA evidence to obtain:
278 In practice, the order in which investigators marshal evidence can matter. For example,
it is conceivable that if an initial trawl would lead the police to the correct suspect sooner,
it could allow a more targeted investigation resulting in more powerful nongenetic
evidence against the defendant. See supra note 172. However, the evidentiary value of
the trawl itself is the same whether it comes first or last, and when the nongenetic evidence
is the same (as in the analysis here), the order has no effect on the value of the total
evidence.
[Vol. 87
2009] ANALYSIS OF DNA TRAWLING CASES 501
p,=Pr(SjIF&T)= Li, ,.5
0- i Pil
Substituting (B.14) into (B.15) and simplifying yields
-LAfpi (B.16)
ZJ" N1L~
In the trawl-first, investigate-second case we begin with the
prior distribution p and update first with the trawl data T to obtain:
Li pi (B.17)j = Pr(Sj I T) = N-I1
Then we update these probabilities with the nongenetic findings F:
= Pr(S. IT & F) = fP" (B.18)
Substituting (B.17) into (B.18) and simplifying yields:
= f1 Lip1  (B.19)PJ;"= N-1
Equation (B.19) is equivalent to (B.16). This equivalence
establishes that the order of acquiring the same evidence has no effect
on its probative value, at least where the joint likelihood Pr(T&1S0)
= Pr(T1 SO) x Pr(F So). For such conditionally independent evidence,
whether the defendant was a suspect before the trawl, or whether he
became a suspect only after the trawl, the combination of the same
genetic and nongenetic evidence is equally powerful.
4. The Trawl-then-confirm-unsuccessfully Case
Finally, suppose that the police were unable to locate substantial
nongenetic evidence against Io. This is the naked-trawl case. If the
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prosecution can explain away the lack of other evidence in its case,
we need only consider the impact of the evidence E,, on the prior
probability 7r0 and compare it to the impact of E, in the simple
confirmation case. Because the hypotheses and the DNA findings are
unchanged, there are no new likelihoods to compute. The difference
in the nongenetic evidence only affects the prior probability. Because
there is no nongenetic evidence of guilt to consider in forming the
prior probability in the naked-trawl case, 7r0 is smaller than it was in
Examples 1 and 2. But whatever its value, the denominator of (B.13)
is larger than that of (B.4), and mr0' is correspondingly larger.
Example 3. With no other evidence at hand, a database of
100,000 people, including I0, is searched. Let the prior probability for
the hypothesis So be 7r, = 1/1,000,001. Let the fraction 0 of the
remaining prior probability of 1 - 7r0 = 1,000,000/1,000,001 that falls on
the men outside the database be 5/6. Then, by (B.13), the posterior
will be Pr(SoIE1.00) = 18/23 = 0.78.
This is much smaller than Pr(S0IE,) = 3000/3001 = 0.9997
obtained with (B.4) in Example 1, but that calculation started with a
prior that incorporated the nongenetic information that is not present
in this case. If the far smaller prior probability of 1/1,000,001 is used
in (B.4), then the posterior is Pr(SE,) = 3/4 = 0.75. The correct
computation in this example thus shows that the confirmation-trawl
evidence is slightly stronger than an isolated DNA match.
One might well ask where the prior probability comes from
without some nongenetic evidence to consider. Is there no
presumption of innocence? The presumption can be interpreted as
follows: the mere fact the defendant has been charged is not
evidence. At the outset, a jury should be willing to treat anyone and
everyone alike by attaching the same prior probability to everyone in
the relevant population. For N people in the population, the uniform
prior is 1/N, and (B.4) simplifies to
I I
zo = Pr(So I E) = 1 (B.4U)
The corresponding version of (B.13) is
,r I = Pr(So IEF) = 1 (B.13U)
1+ O(N-1)p"
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Because 0 < 0 < 1, the DNA trawl evidence leads to a higher posterior
probability than the DNA evidence in the confirmation case
(subtracting out the nongenetic evidence).
